Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 59

Issue 2

Article 2

3-2006

The Impact of Joinder and Severance on Federal Criminal Cases:
An Empirical Study
Andrew D. Leipold
Hossein A. Abbasi

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew D. Leipold and Hossein A. Abbasi, The Impact of Joinder and Severance on Federal Criminal
Cases: An Empirical Study, 59 Vanderbilt Law Review 349 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol59/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

The Impact of Joinder and Severance
on Federal Criminal Cases:
An Empirical Study
Andrew D. Leipold
Hossein A. Abbasi

59 Vand. L. Rev. 349 (2006)

It is widely assumed that criminal defendants who face
multiple charges in a single trial have a harder time prevailing than
those who face several trials of one count each. Conventional
wisdom also has it that a defendant who is joined for trial with
other suspects is worse off than one who stands trial alone. Until
now, these assumptions have never been tested empirically. Looking
at nearly 20,000 federal criminal trials over a five-year period, this
Article asks if the traditional beliefs are true, and if so, tries to
measure the impact on trial outcomes of joining counts and
defendants.
It turns out that joinder has a significantprejudicialeffect on
trials, although not quite the same effect that is usually assumed.
Using statistical models that control for a range of variables, the
authors discovered that trial defendants who face multiple counts
are roughly 10% more likely to be convicted of the most serious
charge than a defendant who stands trial on a single count.
Surprisingly, however, joining co-defendants in a single trial had
virtually no impact on the likelihood of conviction, at least in the
aggregate. Using the results of the empirical study, the Article then
reconsiders the competing policy issues that underlie the joinder and
severance doctrine, and explores the implications of the findings.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Dave is in trouble. It was bad enough to be arrested for bank
robbery; now he has learned that the prosecutor plans to join the
current charge with three other, unrelated bank robberies and present
all four counts in a single trial. To his priest and to his lawyer, Dave
admits that he committed the first and the second robberies, but he
did not commit the third or fourth. Dave is smart enough to realize,
however, that once the jury starts hearing evidence of some of the
crimes-all of which will sound quite similar-his ability to cast doubt
on the remaining charges will be dimmed. And Dave's lawyer is smart
enough to know that once the charges are joined, the chances of
splitting them apart are relatively small.
It is widely assumed that criminal defendants who face
multiple charges in a single trial have a harder time prevailing than
those who face several trials of one count each. Conventional wisdom
also has it that a defendant who is joined for trial with other suspects
is in a worse position than one who stands trial alone. These
assumptions have never been tested empirically; this Article tries to
fill the gap. Looking at nearly 20,000 federal criminal trials over a
five-year period, the Article asks if the traditional beliefs are true and,
if so, tries to measure the impact on trial outcomes of joining counts
and defendants.
The effect of joinder on criminal cases is part of a larger debate
about how best to manage a growing criminal docket while still
providing individual justice. The battle lines are easy to describe:
courts and prosecutors typically want joined proceedings, defendants
usually don't. Courts believe that consolidated proceedings play a
"vital role"' in the administration of justice; defendants believe that
they are a source of great prejudice. The problem is that both sides
are right.
The details of joinder and severance law are dry, even boring,
and perhaps as a result, the impact of consolidated trials has received

1.
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little scholarly attention. 2 But the consequences are widespread: more
than half of all federal defendants are charged with multiple counts,
roughly one-third are joined with other defendants, and an
overlapping one-quarter face both-a single proceeding with multiple
charges plus one or more co-defendants. 3 If joinder makes a conviction
significantly more likely, it should have a bearing on prosecutors'
charging decisions, judicial rulings on severance motions, and defense
decisions on whether to plead or stand trial. More importantly,
understanding the dimensions of any prejudice should tell us
something important about the tradeoffs we make between fairness to
4
the accused and efficiency in processing criminal cases.
Part II provides some background and describes the risks
created by joinder. Part III(A) sets forth some working hypotheses
and then offers an original empirical case for the prejudicial impact of
joinder on the defense. Part III(B) then tests the empirical case with
statistical models, trying to control for various features besides joinder
that might explain the differences in trial outcome. To preview the
results: it turns out that there is a measurable and significant
prejudicial effect from joining multiple counts in a single trial, but the
impact of joining multiple defendants is far less clear. With the
results of the empirical test in hand, Part 1V argues for a
reconsideration of the competing interests and poses questions for
future study.

2.
The best analysis of joinder and severance remains Robert 0. Dawson, Joint Trials of
Defendants in Criminal Cases: An Analysis of Efficiencies and Prejudices,77 MICH. L. REV. 1379
(1979). See also James R. Lucas, CriminalJoinderand Severance, 57 INTER ALIA 17 (1992); John
F. Decker, Joinder and Severance in Federal Criminal Cases: An Examination of Judicial
Interpretationof the FederalRules, 53 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 147 (1977); Note, Joint and Single
Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553, 560
(1965).
3.
See infra Tables A, B, and C in Part III.A. 1 (reporting statistics for federal criminal
defendants between 1999 and 2003).
4.
Although this paper will address only joinder in federal cases, it is worth noting that
many states follow the federal formulation of the rules, at least with respect to joinder of
offenses.

4
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("The

overwhelming majority of states have adopted the federal language [in Rule 8(a)] or something
very close to it." (footnote omitted)). With respect to joinder of defendants, "[t]he statutes and
court rules in over a third of the states utilize [Rule 8(b)'s] language, while some others either
add to that language or else employ wording of about the same specificity permitting either
somewhat broader or somewhat narrower joinder than in the federal system" (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 603-04.
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II.BACKGROUND

A. The Rules and Rationales
There are two types of joinder in criminal cases: combining
multiple charges against a defendant in a single case ("joinder of
offenses") and charging multiple defendants in a single proceeding
("joinder of defendants"). The two types can be combined, of course, so
that multiple counts can be brought against multiple defendants in
5
one consolidated case.
The initial decision to join charges or defendants is made by
the prosecutor. She drafts the indictment that, when approved by the
grand jury, will name the defendants charged and specify the counts
against each. Presumptively, all counts and all defendants named in
one indictment will be resolved in a single trial. This initial joinder
decision is discretionary: the prosecutor "may" charge multiple
offenses or multiple defendants in one indictment but is not required
to do so. 6 If the government originally files separate indictments
against different defendants or separate charges against a single
accused, the prosecutor can later combine them for a single trial,
although now she needs permission from the court. 7 In theory, a
defendant can request that all charges against him be consolidated or
that his trial be combined with those of other defendants, but as we
will see, joinder provides so few benefits to the accused that motions of
8
this type are rare.
Charges and defendants cannot be combined indiscriminately;
there must be some nexus among the pieces to justify a single trial.
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prov'ides that the
prosecutor can charge a defendant with multiple counts in a single

5.
Unless the text or context suggests otherwise, we will use the term "joinder" and its
derivatives to refer to all types of joined proceedings, involving both charges and defendants. At
times the term "consolidation" will also be used, referring to the same concept as joinder.
6.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a)-(b). The ability to join or not join charges is, however, subject to
limits imposed by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See infra note 135 and
accompanying text (explaining how the charging of several overlapping crimes may result in the
dismissal of some charges pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
7.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 13 ("The court may order that separate cases be tried together as
though brought in a single indictment or information if all offenses and all defendants could have
been joined in a single indictment or information."). Cf. U.S. v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 919 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) ("[T]he wording of [Rule 13] is permissive; all offenses which could be tried together
thereunder need not be.").
8.
See infra Part II.B.
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trial in one of three settings.9 First, joinder is allowed if the alleged
crimes are based on the "the same act or transaction." Thus, the
defendant who robs a liquor store and discharges a weapon can be
required to face both charges in one trial. 10
Second, joinder is
permitted if the alleged crimes are part of a "common scheme or plan,"
such as when a middleman buys drugs from a supplier then sells them
to a distributor.1 Finally, charges can be joined if they are of the
"same or similar character." A defendant who buys stolen goods in
June and then again in October may face both counts at once, even if
the two charges are distant in time and location and even if they are
12
not part of an overarching criminal plan.
The rules are similar but not identical for joined defendants.
Despite Justice Jackson's observation that "guilt is personal,"'13 trials
often are not. Under Rule 8(b), multiple defendants can be charged in
a single indictment if they are alleged to have participated in the same
act or transaction, or the same series of acts or transactions, that
constituted a crime. 14 Once defendants are consolidated, the counts
against each individual defendant must meet the requirements for
joinder of offenses, but since each defendant need not be charged with
each count in the indictment, 15 it is possible that a great deal of
evidence that will be heard at trial will have nothing to do with some
of the defendants. Thus, Defendant X who is charged only with
9.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). Rule 8 was intended to codify the law as it existed when the
Federal Rules became effective in 1946, and its language has not changed since then. 1A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 3 (1999). For an extensive
discussion of the history of Rule 8 and of federal practice prior to the adoption of the Rule, see
Lester B. Orfield, Joinderin FederalCriminal Procedure, 26 F.R.D. 23 (1961).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
possession of stolen mail and assault on postal inspector were part of same "transaction" for
joinder purposes where assault was an attempt to avoid arrest for the illegal possession). The
court in Woody noted that it used an "expansive interpretation of what constitutes a 'transaction'
under Rule 8(a)." Id.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1427 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding joinder
of felon-in-possession count with drug distribution count was proper, since "the handgun was
arguably related to and part of Johnson's drug trafficking scheme").
12. See, e.g., United States v. Tyndall, 263 F.3d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding sexual
attacks on two different victims two years apart were of the "same or similar character" for Rule
8 purposes).
13. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("Now, if any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is personal and not
inheritable.").
14. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). Note that in contrast to the joinder of offenses, multiple
defendants who merely engage in "similar acts" may not be joined for trial unless those acts were
part of the same transaction or series of transactions. See United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346,
389 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that joinder of defendants under Rule 8(b) is proper "only if each of
the counts of the indictment arises out of the same act or transaction or series of transactions").
15. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) ("[A]Ill defendants need not be charged in each count.").
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conspiracy may be forced to sit through a trial where the jury hears
evidence not only of the conspiracy between Defendants X and Y, but
evidence of how Y also committed murder and extorted money from
widows and orphans, crimes for which X was not charged and was not
16
even allegedly involved.
The advantages of joint trials to courts, prosecutors, and
society are obvious. 17 Trials are expensive, time consuming, and
burdensome on witnesses and victims, so if a matter can be resolved
with one trial instead of two or three, the saved resources are
significant. Often the evidence for each count and against each
defendant will be substantially the same. Thus, it would seem
wasteful to require witnesses to attend and give the same testimony
three times, to require three sets of jurors to consider identical
evidence, and to require the lawyers and judges to go through
multiple, identical performances. And of course, courts are always
pressed for time: at the end of 2004 there were over 60,000 criminal
cases pending in the federal district courts, an increase of over 100%
since 1995.18 In a world with few enough resources to conduct a single
trial correctly, holding three very similar proceedings seems like an
extravagance.
Efficiency is the cardinal justification for the joinder rules but
not the only one. A secondary justification is the desire to avoid the
"scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts." 19 If two defendants
are charged with the same crime and face identical evidence, a single
trial reduces the chance that a jury will acquit one and convict the
other. It would be embarrassing, after all, to have different juries
reach different results when presented with the same facts, especially
if there is nothing to suggest that one jury was inclined to acquit
against the evidence. Consolidated trials reduce the risk that a jury

16. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 325 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that
joinder was proper where defendant was alleged to have participated in the overall scheme, even
though he was named in fewer than ten percent of the overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy).
17. For a discussion of the advantages of joint trials, see Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200,
209-10 (1987); see also Dawson, supra note 2, at 1382-89 (discussing the "supposed efficiencies"
of consolidated trials).
18. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics,
Judicial Caseload Indicators, Calendar Years 1995, 2000, 2003, and 2004, http://www.uscourts.
gov/caseload2004/front/judbus03.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2006). At the end of 1995 the number
of cases pending was 28,091; by 2004, the number was 62,857, an increase of 124% over nine
years. During 2004 there were 70,746 new criminal cases filed. Id.
19. See Marsh, 481 U.S. at 210.
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will act in a way that looks to outsiders like capricious
20
decisionmaking.
Because of these interests, there is a "preference in the federal
system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together."21 But
courts and other observers also have long understood that the benefits
of efficiency and consistency may come at a high cost.
B. The Risk of Prejudice
A suspect facing joined counts is worried about three types of
risk. His first concern is that the jury will look at the list of
accusations against him and infer that he has a criminal disposition,
which could erode the presumption of innocence. 2 2 Holmes observed
that "it cannot be said that by common experience the character of
most people indicted by a grand jury is good,"' 23 and the more counts in
the indictment, the quicker the jury may be to assume that the
24
accused must be guilty of something.
A second worry is that multiple counts require multiple blocks
of evidence, and the jury (or judge) might confuse which block of
evidence relates to which crime. 25 Particularly when the charges are
20. For an insightful discussion of inconsistent jury decisionmaking, see Eric L. Muller, The
Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771
(1998).
21. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993).
22. See United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 929 (2d Cir. 1980) (asserting that "[w]hile
the mere fact that 'juries are apt to regard with a more jaundiced eye a person charged with two
crimes than a person charged with one" does not require severance, trial judges must be alert to
the possibility that juries will cumulate the evidence of the separate charges and convict); see
also United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733, 736 (4th Cir. 1976) (noting that although "other
crimes" are normally inadmissible to prove a criminal disposition, "[olne inevitable consequence
of a joint trial is that the jury will be aware of evidence of one crime while considering the
defendant's guilt or innocence of another. If the rationale of the 'other crimes' rule is correct, it
would seem that some degree of prejudice is necessarily created by permitting the jury to hear
evidence of both crimes." (citations omitted)).
23. Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 561 (1918).
24. Social scientists have found in laboratory experiments that the "halo effect" of multiple
charges can lead mock jurors to find the accused less believable, less likeable, and more
dangerous than people who are charged with only a single count, with the result that "a
defendant is more likely to be convicted by mock jurors of any one charge when that offense is
combined with another at trial." Edith Greene & Elizabeth F. Loftus, When Crimes Are Joined at
Trial, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAVIOR 193, 194, 197-98 (1985). The researchers are careful to note,
however, that their experiment could not clearly determine whether the mock jurors' attitude
about the defendant's character was a cause or effect of their conclusion about the defendant's
guilt. They could only conclude that "jurors' sentiments toward the defendant is [sic] different
when they know that he is charged with multiple crimes." Id. at 198.
25. The social science research supports the notion of jury confusion, although its impact on
verdicts is less clear. One laboratory study found that jurors were likely to become confused by
the evidence in a joined-offense trial, and that this inability to compartmentalize correlated to
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of a "same or similar character," 26 a jury might, for example, be so
impressed with the evidence on counts one and two that it fails to
notice that there was insufficient evidence on the very-similar count
three. 27 The danger is compounded when evidence of wrongdoing that
would not be admitted in separate trials is admitted in a single trial,
despite the presence of instructions reminding jurors that certain facts
28
should only be considered with respect to certain counts.
Finally, for the accused who has a defense to some charges but
not others, a multi-count trial can raise a thorny strategic choice: if he
takes the stand to defend himself on Count 1 - a crime he did not
commit - he opens himself up to cross-examination on Count 2, a
crime he did commit. On the other hand, if the defendant stays off the
stand entirely to protect himself on Count 2, his chances of acquittal
on Count 1 diminish. 29 In short, the all-or-nothing aspect of taking

guilty verdicts. See Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Information Processing in Joined
and Severed Trials, 13 J. App. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 351, 369 (1983) ("It is clear from the cognition
and memory data that jurors in a joined trial situation cannot keep the two charges separate and
arrive at independent verdicts."). Other studies have found evidence of jury confusion, but
concluded that this confusion did not lead to biased verdicts. See James Farrin, Note, Rethinking
CriminalJoinder: An Analysis of the EmpiricalResearch and Its Implications for Justice, 52 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 325, 328-29 (1989) (summarizing social science research on this issue). One
other study found no evidence of confusion caused by multiple blocks of evidence, although the
researchers acknowledged that this conclusion may be the result of giving the mock jurors
relatively little evidence to remember. See Greene & Loftus, supra note 24, at 205-07 (finding
little evidence of "memory effect" or "spillover phenomenon" when evidence involving two
offenses was presented, in varying order, to mock jurors).
26. See, e.g., Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 93-94 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (noting the danger
of jury confusion over evidence on two distinct but similar crimes).
27. See Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1083-86 (9th Cir. 1998) (granting a habeas
petition because, inter alia, the trial judge should have severed the counts). The court noted:
[Niot only did the trial court join counts for which the evidence was not crossadmissible, but the State repeatedly encouraged the jury to consider the two sets of
charges in concert, as reflecting the modus operandi characteristic of Bean's criminal
activities. Thus, the jury could not "reasonably [have been] expected to
'compartmentalize the evidence' so that evidence of one crime [did] not taint the jury's
consideration of another crime."
Id. at 1084 (citation omitted).
28. The fact that a joint trial would admit evidence that would be inadmissible in separate
trials can be grounds for severance, but it is not necessarily so. As long as the otherwiseinadmissible evidence is "simple and distinct," so that the jurors can keep straight in their minds
which evidence relates to which alleged crime, joinder is permitted. See, e.g., United States v.
Alexander, 135 F.3d 470, 477-78 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that severance was not required
where evidence on each of fourteen counts was relatively straightforward and the whole trial
lasted only four days).
29, The leading case on this issue is United States v. Cross, 335 F.2d 897, 989 (D.C. Cir.
1964). See also United States v. Fenton, 367 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 2004) ("A defendant seeking a
severance for the purpose of testifying on one of several counts must make a threshold showing
that he has salient testimony to give anent one count and an articulable need to refrain from
giving testimony on the other(s)." (citation omitted)).
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the stand at trial can prevent the accused from putting on his best
30
defense for each of the charges.
In some cases, there can also be advantages to the defendant
31
from having all the allegations against him resolved in one sitting.
For defendants who plead guilty, having the charges handled by a
single prosecutor in a single package might facilitate a guilty plea that
reflects a "volume discount." For those who plan to go to trial, a single
proceeding can save money and trauma for the suspect and his
family. 32 More importantly, a single trial means that the defendant
may only have to cast doubt on the prosecutor's case once. Just as the
jury may infer a criminal disposition from a long list of charges, it
might also infer a weak government position on all charges if the
accused can undermine the case on a critical point.
Thus, when considering the impact of joined charges, it is
important to remember that sometimes the defendant will have
agreed to the single proceeding (or would have agreed had he been
asked).3 3 But on balance, we should not be distracted by this fact.
Although in theory the defendant can move to join cases that were
originally brought separately, 34 the (admittedly impressionistic) sense
of the reported cases is that it is prosecutors who want to consolidate
35
charges and defendants who resist, not the other way around.
Nonetheless, the possibility of defense acquiescence to this type of
joinder is a noteworthy qualification on the conclusions drawn below.
Joining defendants in a single trial presents similar risks but
adds none of the advantages of joint charging. An accused who sits at
the defense table with other suspects risks being found guilty by
30. The decision whether to testify is the most common strategic problem created by
joinder, but it is not the only one. A defendant who wishes to represent himself on one charge but
have appointed counsel for the other faces a similar choice. The Ninth Circuit recently
considered and rejected a claim that having to choose between these two constitutionallyprotected rights required severance. Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2005).
31. For a discussion of some of the potential benefits, see 2 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 13-2.1, Commentary (2d ed. 1980).

32. Id.; see also Farrin, supra note 25, at 327 (noting that a defendant "may prefer the
convenience of a single trial, may have his case disposed of more quickly, or may benefit from
concurrent sentencing").
33. If the prosecutor brings all charges in a single indictment and defendant prefers this
arrangement, the defense has no occasion to signal his acquiescence, making it hard to know how
often this fact pattern occurs.
34. Federal Rule 13 provides that "the court may order" joinder of separate cases, without
restriction on which party may ask the court to do so. FED. R. CRIM. P. 13.
35. Cf. 1A WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 221, at 472 (observing that while either party can move
for severance, "[s]ince the government is usually in a controlling position with respect to the
drafting of indictments and the joinder of defendants and offenses, there would seem ordinarily
to be little point in permitting a motion by the prosecutor," although noting that some have been
granted).
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association, especially if his co-defendants have stronger evidence
offered against them. 36 In a joint trial, the jury will be exposed to
"spillover evidence," which might consist not only of information about
the co-defendants' crimes (which is bad enough), 37 but also evidence of
the defendant's own other bad acts, which now come to the jury's
attention through the case against the co-defendants. In addition,
joinder of multiple defendants introduces the risk of confusing jurors
as to which evidence applies against which suspect, a risk that grows
worse as the number of defendants increases. 38 Co-defendants may
present antagonistic defenses 39 or make different decisions about
whether to testify, 40 making distinctions among the defendants stark.
Co-defendants who take the stand are often sorely tempted to point
the fingers at others, confronting a defendant with an additional layer
41
of accusation he would not have faced had he been tried separately.

36. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(noting that in a joint conspiracy trial, "[tihere generally will be evidence of wrongdoing by
somebody. It is difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own merits in the
minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked together.").
37. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 98 F.3d 330, 335 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that
defendant was prejudiced by spillover evidence of co-defendants' participation in a conspiracy
and that although evidence was relatively straightforward, the risk to the defendant who was
not part of the conspiracy was sufficiently high to require separate trials); cf. United States v.
Johnson, 297 F.3d 845, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that "spillover evidence" of co-defendants'
crimes was not "manifestly prejudicial" because it would have been admissible in a separate
trial, "was inconsequential in the grand scheme of things," or was cured through limiting jury
instructions).
38. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993) ("[Elvidence of a codefendant's
wrongdoing in some circumstances erroneously could lead a jury to conclude that a defendant
was guilty. When many defendants are tried together in a complex case and they have markedly
different degrees of culpability, this risk of prejudice is heightened.").
39. See id. at 538-39 (recognizing the risk of antagonistic defenses, but holding that they
are not per se grounds for severance).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Hodges, 502 F.2d 586, 587 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that denial
of severance was proper even though co-defendants took the stand and co-defense counsel
commented on his clients' willingness to testify).
41. As the Ninth Circuit has observed:
Defendants who accuse each other bring the effect of a second prosecutor into the case
with respect to their codefendant. In order to zealously represent his client, each
codefendant's counsel must do everything possible to convict the other defendant. The
existence of this extra prosecutor is particularly troublesome because the defense
counsel are not always held to the limitations and standards imposed on the
government prosecutor.
United States v. Tootick, 952 F.2d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1991). But cf. United States v. Flores, 362
F.3d 1030, 1039-40 (8th Cir. 2004) ("The mere fact that one defendant tries to shift blame to
another defendant does not mandate separate trials ... as a codefendant frequently attempts to
'point the finger,' to shift the blame, or to save himself at the expense of the other" (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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But unlike the joinder of charges, there is almost no advantage
to the accused in being tried jointly.4 2 The ability of the joined
defendants to pool their resources and hire common counsel may
provide a slight benefit, but even here, the risk of creating a
problematic conflict of interest is great. In short, if given the choice
between a trial with other defendants and being tried alone, it appears
that a high percentage of suspects would choose the latter.
C. The Legal Response and Remedy
An accused who wants to avoid the risks of joinder has two
possible lines of attack. He can initially argue to the trial court that
the joinder fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 8; if he is correct,
this constitutes "misjoinder" and the judge is required to sever. 4 3 But
even if the initial joinder was proper, a defendant can ask the court for
severance. Federal Rule 14 provides that if joinder "appears to
prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order
separate trials of counts, sever the defendants' trials, or provide any
other relief that justice requires."4 4 The text makes clear that even if
a defendant is harmed by the consolidation, severance is not the only,
or even the preferred, option. Probably the most common species of
"other relief' is curative jury instructions - an admonishment from the
court to make sure that there is sufficient evidence for each separate
count, and a warning not to confuse or attribute the evidence on one
charge or against one defendant to any other. 45
42. See Dawson, supra note 2, at 1388-89 (noting and then discounting the argument that
there are advantages to defendants when they are tried with others). But see infra Part IV.C.2.a
(suggesting an interpretation of the data that would make it advantageous for certain
defendants to be joined at trial with others).
43. If the trial court concludes that joinder is proper and defendant appeals the issue after
conviction, his claim will be subject to harmless error review. See, e.g., United States v. Macking,
315 F.3d 399, 412 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that such error raises no constitutional problems and
is reviewed for harmlessness); cf. 1A WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 221 at 465 ("If the original joinder
was improper, Rule 14 confers no discretion. The trial court must order severance, and if it fails
to do so, reversal is likely, although in many cases the error may be regarded as harmless.").
44. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a).
45. For example, the pattern jury instruction in the Seventh Circuit provides:
Even though the defendants are being tried together, you must give each of them
separate consideration. In doing this, you must analyze what the evidence shows
about each defendant[, leaving out of consideration any evidence that was admitted
solely against some other defendant or defendants]. Each defendant is entitled to have
his/her case decided on the evidence and the law that applies to that defendant.
See PATTERN CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, INSTRUCTION

4.05, available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules/pjury.pdf. The Drafting Committee
Comment then adds: "In cases involving more than one count, it will be necessary for the court to
instruct both as to the separate consideration for each defendant and also with regard to
separate consideration of charges." Id.
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Not surprisingly, courts have adopted a balancing test in
applying Rule 14, weighing the savings that come from a single trial
against the possible harm to the defense. 46 Sometimes courts find the
balancing quite easy. For example, virtually all courts agree that if
the evidence in a joint trial would still be admissible against the
defendant in a separate trial, the accused gains nothing from
47
severance and the interest in efficiency prevails.
In other cases the balancing is (or should be) harder, but the
outcome is usually the same. Defendants are entitled to relief if it
"appears" they will be harmed, yet most courts admit that some
degree of prejudice from joinder may be inevitable and, in any event,
is an acceptable price to pay for the efficiency gains. One of the best
known articulations of this view came a few years before the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, when the
Second Circuit said, "Congress has authorized consolidation [of trials]
in the belief that public considerations of economy and speed outweigh
48
possible unfairness to the accused."
In the intervening decades, courts have echoed this view with
varying degrees of vigor. The D.C. Circuit has noted that whether it is
joinder of charges or joinder of defendants, "some prejudice almost
necessarily results," but that "Rule 8(a) permits the first sort of
prejudice and Rule 8(b) the second." 49 The Second Circuit has agreed
that the dangers of prejudice from joinder are "inevitabl[e]" 50 and that
Rule 8(a) "necessarily recognizes the adverse effect on the defendant
by a joinder of counts, but considers this to be outweighed by gains in
trial economy when one of the criteria of the rule are [sic] met. ' 51
46. E.g., United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 655 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[I]n evaluating
joinder.., the trial court must balance its obligation to avoid prejudice that may result from
joining multiple defendants against a policy favoring maximum trial efficiency.").
47. See, e.g., United States v. Soto-Beniquez, 356 F.3d 1, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2003); United
States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 370 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that severance is very difficult to
obtain in conspiracy cases because "acts committed by one [co-conspirator] in furtherance of the
conspiracy [are] admissible against the other" co-conspirator).
48. United States v. Smith, 112 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1940). More recent cases have quoted or
cited the Smith language with approval. E.g., United States v. McClellan, No. 93-4084, 1994 WL
589497, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 1994) (quoting Smith); United States v. Turoff, 853 F.2d 1037,
1043 (2d Cir. 1988) (same).
49. Cupo v. United States, 359 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
50. Turoff, 853 F.2d at 1043.
51. United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 929 (2d Cir. 1980); see also United States v.
Flores, 362 F.3d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Once defendants are properly joined under Rule 8,
there is a strong presumption for their joint trial."); United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1139
(1st Cir. 1981) ("A joinder of offenses, or of defendants, involves a presumptive possibility of
prejudice to the defendant." (quoting King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 703 (1st Cir. 1966)));
United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1977) ("We recognize that even
permissible joinder will often result in some prejudice to a defendant. The purpose of rule 8(b) is
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Given that some harm is inevitable, courts have naturally concluded
that cases should be severed only if the defendant can show that the
prejudice is "severe" or "compelling,"5 2 even though these
qualifications do not appear in Rule 14. Or as one court put it, "Since
Rule 8 anticipates some prejudice, severance under Rule 14 is limited
53
to cases of 'substantial prejudice."'
This tolerance of harm to the accused makes courts disinclined
to find misjoinder 54 and miserly in granting severance, 55 a practice
that has been sharply criticized. Charles Alan Wright put it best
when he said it "seems strange that one presumably innocent may be
made to undergo something less than a fair trial, or that he may be
prejudiced in his defense if the prejudice is not 'substantial,' merely to
serve the convenience of the prosecution and the efficiency of the
56
judicial system."
It does indeed seem strange that courts are so willing to
tolerate this apparent unfairness, strange enough that we should dig
deeper. The best potential explanation for this casual judicial attitude
would be that, despite their language, judges have abiding faith in

to limit joinder to those cases where considerations of trial efficiency clearly outweigh a
defendant's interest in a separate trial."); United States v. Orefice, No. 98 CR. 1295(DLC), 1999
WL 349701, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1999) ("The policy behind Rule 8(a) is that considerations of
economy and speed outweigh possible unfairness to the defendant so as to justify joinder.").
52. United States v. Liveoak, 377 F.3d 859, 864 (8th Cir. 2004). The court also states that
"[t]o grant a motion for severance, the necessary prejudice must be severe or compelling ...."Id.
at 693 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Cf. 1A WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 223 at
489-90 ("The burden is put on the defendants to make a strong showing of prejudice in order to
obtain the relief permitted by Rule 14. With such a test, it is hardly surprising that in most cases
relief has been denied.").
53. United States v. Alverado, No. 92 Cr. 728 (LMM), 1994 WL 669968, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
30, 1994); see also United States v. Sarracino, 340 F.3d 1148, 1165 (10th Cir. 2003) ("[Sleverance
is not required even if prejudice is shown; 'tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, [is left] to
the district court's sound discretion."' (citation omitted)). For an additional discussion of this
point, see Andrew D. Leipold, How the PretrialProcess Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42
AM. CR. L. REV. 1123 (2005) (discussing how joinder and severance rules have the potential to
"expose[] the jury to evidence that is unfairly prejudicial").
54. See, e.g., Liveoak, 377 F.3d at 864 (stating that joinder requirements should be liberally
construed); United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1427 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Although alleged
misjoinder under Rule 8 is a question of law subject to de novo review, we construe Rule 8
broadly to allow liberal joinder to enhance the efficiency of the judicial system.").
55. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 4, § 17.1(f) at 602 ("[Djefendants generally have not
fared very well under rules and statutes which permit them to obtain a severance of offenses
only upon proof of prejudice."); 1A WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 4-5 (noting the "restrictive and
unrealistic construction courts have put on Rule 14," and the "reluctance of trial and appellate
courts to grant separate trials").
56. 1A WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 141, at 6; see also Dawson, supra note 2, at 1381 ("[Clourts
have greatly exaggerated the supposed efficiencies of joint trials while grossly underestimating
the impediments joint trials pose to fair and accurate determinations of individual guilt or
innocence.").
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their own ability to spot the cases of genuine prejudice and to take
corrective action. The risks of joinder are well known, and if judges
truly can spot the riskiest cases and take remedial steps, perhaps the
prejudice is more hypothetical than real.
What is missing from the discussion is an empirical measure of
the impact of joinder on criminal cases. The next Part provides a first
attempt to quantify what we will call the "joinder effect."
III. THE PREJUDICIAL IMPACT OF JOINDER

A. The Threshold Empirical Case
The first step in evaluating the impact of joinder is to ask some
basic questions. How often do defendants face multiple charges rather
than a single count? How often are they joined with other defendants,
and how often are both conditions (multiple defendants and multiple
counts) present? We will refer to these various combinations of joined
counts and joined co-defendants as the accused's "joinder status."
Second, we will ask if the outcomes of the cases differ
depending on the defendant's joinder status. Here we will examine
outcomes in two ways: (i) for those defendants who go to trial, the
likelihood that they will be convicted; and then secondarily, (ii) the
likelihood that a defendant will plead guilty rather than go to trial.
Our working hypothesis will track the assumptions that courts
and commentators make about consolidation. Namely:
* defendants who are charged with multiple counts are more
likely to be convicted at trial than defendants who are
charged with a single count;
" defendants who stand trial with other defendants are more
likely to be convicted than those who stand trial alone; and
" defendants who face multiple charges and stand trial with
multiple defendants are more likely to be convicted than
any other group.
To these three we can add a fourth, conditional prediction.
If those who face multiple counts and/or who are joined for trial with
others are more likely to be convicted, we would expect to see
defendants in those groups pleading guilty more often than those who
are not similarly joined. We assume that a defendant who faces a
reduced chance of winning at trial is less likely to risk a trial than
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others and is more willing to take whatever benefits are offered in
57
return for a plea.
To answer these questions and test these hypotheses, we
58
calculated original statistics from relatively raw government data.
We began by looking at the records of over 375,000 formally charged
federal defendants whose cases terminated during fiscal years 1999
59
through 2003.
1. The Frequency of Joinder
Over the five-year period of this study, nearly half of the
defendants were charged with a single count, the other half with more
than one count. Of those charged with multiple counts, roughly half
again (26% of all defendants) were charged with two counts, and a
generally diminishing percentage were charged with an increasing
number of offenses, as shown in Table A.

57. We assume that a higher percentage of guilty pleas based on joinder status means that
these defendants collectively are worse off, even though in individual cases they may not be.
Often a suspect will plead guilty in exchange for a concession from the prosecutor, and in cases
where the evidence of guilt is strong, the defendant may be in a much better position than if he
had gone to trial. However, if certain groups of defendants face a higher chance of conviction at
trial than others, their bargaining power is surely reduced, putting them in a relatively worse
position than they would be in the absence of joinder.
58. Unless otherwise indicated, the numbers and statistics presented in the balance of this
paper are original calculations derived from the records compiled by the Federal Judicial Center,
the research and education agency of the federal judicial system. See generally Federal Judicial
Center Home Page, http://www.fjc.gov/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2006) (providing access to FJC
publications, information on federal judicial history, and links to educational programs and
materials). The data are made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research (ICPSR), located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. See Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Front Page, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu (last visited
Mar. 24, 2006) (providing the ability to search for specific data holdings from its front page). The
1999 and 2000 data sets are found in Study Number ICPSR 8429, Datasets (DS) 112 and 113.
The 2001 database is found at Study Number ICPSR 3415, DS1. The 2002 data are found at
Study Number 4059, DS3; and the 2003 data at Study Number 4026, DS5. For each of the
datasets, one record equals one defendant, which is the unit of measurement used in this paper.
59. To avoid double counting across the years, we only used cases for which there had been
a final resolution during fiscal years 1999-2003 (i.e., the variable STATUSCD = L). The number
of defendants whose cases met this description was 393,225. Of this number, we eliminated
17,505 cases (4.5% of the database) where the disposition of the most serious count (variable
DISP1) was "final" for court reporting purposes, but was not necessarily a final resolution of the
criminal charges against that defendant. Thus, we did not include 11,885 defendants for whom
the most serious charge against them was dismissed without prejudice. In addition, we
eliminated cases where the charges resulted in a pre-trial diversion (1,926 defendants); where
the case was transferred to another judicial district for disposition (3,531 defendants); cases that
ended in a mistrial (132 defendants); and cases that resulted in some other non-final resolution
(31 defendants). As modified, the final dataset contained 375,720 records.
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TABLE A
Joinder of Federal Criminal Charges 1999-2003
Number of Defendants Percent of Defendants

Number of Counts
1
2

183,540
99,321

49%
26%

3
4
5 or more

38,396
22,759
31,704

10%
6%
8%

Total

375,720

100%

During the same five-year period, nearly two-thirds (65%) of
federal defendants were charged alone, while the remaining one-third
were joined with others, either in the original indictment or via Rule
13. Many of the joined defendants were charged with only one codefendant, but a non-trivial number (14%) were charged with four or
60
more others, as shown in Table B.
TABLE B
Joinder of Federal Criminal Defendants 1999-2003
No. Defendants in
No. of
Percent of
Case
Defendants
Defendants
1
245,575
65%
2
43,089
11%
3
21,754
6%
4

13,017

4%

5 or more

52,285

14%

Total

375,720

100%

These two categories overlap. If we simplify our categories to
cases where defendants: (a) face one charge or more than one charge;
and (b) stand trial alone or with at least one other co-defendant, we
can see the relationships in a simple matrix.

60. Tables A and B (as well some of the other Tables and Figures infra) provide data for a
category "5 or more" charges or defendants. Although both categories have the same label, there
is a slight difference between them. While some number of defendants undoubtedly faced more
than five charges, the datasets only collect information on the five most serious counts; they give
no indication how many defendants faced more than five counts or of the disposition of those
later counts. In contrast, the dataset allows us to determine precisely how many defendants were
joined in a particular case, and for administrative convenience, we created the category "5 or
more." We do not believe this categorization has any effect on the statistics or the conclusions.
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TABLE C
Frequency of Joinder, 1999-2003
One Defendant

Multiple
Defendants

Total

One Count

40%
(n = 150,276)

9%
(n = 33,264)

49%
(n = 183,540)

Multiple Counts

25%
(n = 95,299)

26%
(n = 96,881)

51%
(n =192,180)

Total

65%
(n = 245,575)

35%
(n = 130,145)

100%
(n = 375,720)

These figures confirm that consolidation is quite common.
Thus, if even a small amount of prejudice attaches to joinder, it will
affect a substantial number of defendants.
Importantly, these large numbers do not tell us the status of
defendants who actually went to trial. Notice that in the discussion of
prejudice in Part II(B), nearly all of the presumed harms occur at the
trial itself. So while even the expectation of prejudice at trial may
influence a decision to plead guilty (more on this later 6 ), it is
important to know how often the risk of prejudice is presented, a
figure that requires us to measure how often joinder occurs among
trial defendants.
Here, we need to define the terms carefully because, for our
purposes, joinder among trial defendants is different than joinder in
general. In the previous three tables, we measured the extent to
which a defendant was charged with multiple crimes or with other
defendants-the tables told us how popular joinder is. But now we are
interested in how often a defendant is faced with multiple counts or
sits at counsel table next to co-defendants at the trial itself. Here we
do not care if a defendant was originally charged with two counts if he
pleads guilty to one before trial; in our calculations, he will be treated
as having faced only a single count. Likewise, even if Defendant A
was originally indicted along with three others, we will not count him
as being joined with other defendants for trial if the co-defendants B,
C, and D all pled guilty, had their cases dismissed, or otherwise
washed out of the system.

61.

See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing whether joinder of defendants causes prejudice).
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Only 5 percent of federal criminal defendants go to trial, so
naturally this group is much smaller. 62 Among trial defendants, the
joinder percentages are different than the "all defendants" group
described above, particularly for multiple defendants.
TABLE

D

Trial Defendants, 1999-2003
Joinder of Charges
No. Counts No. Trial Ds % Trial Ds
1
2
3
4

10,325
4,614
1,957
1,115

Joinder of Defendants
No. Ds
No. Trial Ds % Trial Ds

52%
23%
10%
6%

1
2
3
4

15,146
2,350
1,068
448

76%
12%
5%
2%

5 or more

1,797

9%

5 or more

796

4%

Total

19,808

100%

Total

19,808

100%

Finally, we should ask how often our various joinder status
combinations occur. Here we can return to the basic matrix used
above:
TABLE E
Trial Defendants, Frequency of Joinder
Multiple
Total
Defe
One Defendant
Defendants

Multiple Counts

45%
(n = 8,986)
31%
311748

7%
(n = 1,339)
17%

52%
(n = 10,325)
48%

(n = 6,160)

(n = 3,323)

(n = 9,483)

76%
(n = 15,146)

24%
(n = 4,662)

100%
(n = 19,808)

These figures allow us to make general observations about
what trials look like. Nearly half of all trial defendants (45%) stand
trial alone on a single count. If our working hypotheses are correct,
these are the most-favored defendants because they face no prejudice
from joinder. Conversely, roughly one in six defendants (17%) face
both varieties of prejudice by standing trial with co-defendants on
multiple counts. The remaining suspects (31% + 7% = 38%) have some
62. Between 1999 and 2003, there were 375,720 federal criminal defendants and 19,808
defendants who stood trial on at least one count (19,808 - 375,720 = 0.0527 = 5.3%).
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combination of joinder and non-joinder, which, assuming for the
moment the existence of some prejudicial impact, should allow us to
isolate and identify the type of joint trial (multi-count or multidefendant) that has the greater effect.
2. Case Outcomes
Looking at all federal criminal defendants who stood trial over
a five-year period, we see that on average, slightly more than three63
quarters (77%) were convicted while the rest (23%) were acquitted.
The picture is brighter, however, for those in our hypothesized mostfavored group-the single defendant who stands trial on a single
count. Here only 67% of the defendants are convicted, 10 percentage
64
points lower than the overall average.
We can make an early test of our working hypotheses by
comparing this group to those who face one type of joinder but not
both. But before we do so, we should sidestep an obvious trap. It
would hardly be surprising to find that a defendant charged with four
crimes is more likely to be convicted of something than a defendant
charged with only one offense; in theory, the prosecutor's chances of
getting at least one charge to stick should increase with each joined
offense. So to make sure we are comparing apples to apples, we will
measure how often the defendant was convicted of the most serious
crime charged (designated "Count 1" in the datasets). By limiting our
attention to the conviction rates on the "top count," we can better
isolate the incremental effect of additional charges.
And in fact, the conviction rate does rise when joinder enters
the picture. For defendants who face multiple counts in a single trial,
the conviction rate on the most serious charge jumps dramatically,
from 68% for a single-count defendant to 82% when a second count is
added. The conviction rate for Count 1 then rises again, to 88%, when
Count 3 is added, and then remains steady as other charges are
joined. The conviction percentages are shown in Figure 1:65

63. Of the 19,808 trial defendants identified in Table D, 19,057 went to judgment on the
most serious charge. Of these, 14,589 were convicted (14,589 +19,057 = .7655) and 4,468 were
acquitted (4,468 +19,057 = .2345). In addition, there were 751 defendants who either pled guilty
to the most serious charge or had the top count dismissed, yet nevertheless went to trial on some
of the lesser charges. For consistency, we excluded this small group of defendants and only
included those who went to trial on the most serious count in the calculations.
64. See infra note 67 and Table E for the complete statistics of conviction rates by joinder
status.

65.

See supra Table D for the number of defendants per count category.
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FIGURE 1
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For those who faced the other joinder prong-standing trial with
co-defendants-the conviction rate also jumps, although not as much.
The addition of a second defendant increased the chances of conviction
on Count 1, from 75% when the defendant stands trial alone to 84%
when a second defendant is added. The addition of a third and fourth
defendant has much less of an impact, with the conviction percentage
on Count 1 staying in the mid-80% range, and then dropping back to
76% when trials get really large, involving five or more codefendants. 66 The conviction rates are shown in Figure 2.

66.

See supra Table D for the number in each category of joined defendants.
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FIGURE 2
Conviction Rate by Number of Defendants

100%
90%
80%
70%

60%
50%
40%

30%
1

2

3

4

5 or

more
Number of Defendants

Having isolated the impact of adding counts and adding
defendants, we now can combine the two types of joinder to measure
the impact of joinder status on the trial conviction rate. Table F shows
67
the rates for our four groups.
TABLE F
Conviction Rate by Joinder Status
One Defendant

Multiple Defendants

Total

One Count

67%

77%

68%

Multiple Counts

85%

85%

85%

Total

75%

83%

77%

This Table is largely consistent with our working hypothesis
and provides us with a prima facie case for the prejudicial impact of
joinder.
Table F does, however, reveal one surprise.
Joining
additional charges increases the conviction rate, as does joining
67. There were 8,365 defendants who stood trial alone on a single count, 5,605 (67%) of
whom were convicted. There were 6,068 single defendants who faced multiple counts, 5,167 of
whom were convicted (85%). For those who stood trial with co-defendants, there were 1,317 who
faced a single count, 1,016 of whom were convicted (77%), and 3,307 who faced multiple counts,
of whom 2,891 were convicted (85%).
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additional parties with a single-count defendant.
As between
individual defendants facing multiple counts and joint defendants
facing multiple counts, however, the conviction rate does not change.
This suggests that when a defendant faces multiple counts, joining or
not joining other defendants makes no real difference.
This last point is sufficiently important to warrant a closer
look. Table G uses a Probit Model 68 to isolate the effects of the types
of joinder. In the first model, the only explanatory variable is "counts"
(and a constant). It shows the positive effect of counts on the
probability of conviction. The same result is shown in Model 2 for
number of defendants. But considering both counts and defendants
(Model 3) shows that only the number of counts has significant effect
on the probability of conviction. The comparison of Model 3 with Model
1 shows that the number of defendants in fact has no significant effect
69
on the conviction rate.
TABLE G
Probit Model of guilty/not guilty at trial on the most serious charge
(dependent variable: Guilty('))
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
0.558
0.533
Counts
(0.0207)*
(0.0214)
[0.000]**
[0.000]
0.273
0.111
Number of defendants
(0.0245)
(0.0256)
[0.000]
[0.000]
0.478
0.663
0.464
Constant
(0.0133)
(0.0113)
(0.0137)
[0.000]
[0.000]
[.0o0]
Number of observations
19057
19057
19057
Pseudo R-Squared
0.0360
0.0062
0.0369
Log likelihood
-10005.1
-10314.5
-9995.6
* Standard errors in parentheses
** Numbers in brackets show the probability of coefficient being outside
the 95% confidence interval.
(1) It is equal to one if the defendant is convicted, zero otherwise.

68. In econometrics, whenever the dependent variable is discrete, regular models such as
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) cannot be used. For binary dependent variables (which, in our
case, are set to either "conviction" or "acquittal"), the Probit Model is the widely used alternative.
Using the Probit Model, we estimate the parameters of the model (the coefficients of the
explanatory variables) assuming the distribution of error term to be standard normal. The final
result (the probability of conviction for each of the explanatory variables) is achieved by
calculating the cumulative standard normal distribution function for that point using the
estimated coefficients. For a complete explanation of these models, see G.S. MADDALA, LIMITEDDEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS 22-27.

69. Note that in this comparison the log likelihood and the Pseudo R-Squared (which
measure the reliability of the model) do not change much when the new variable is added.
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This model allows us to draw a modestly significant conclusion.
If it really is the addition of counts that matters, then we should not
worry about those types of prejudice that are specific to the joinder of
defendants. For example, the fear that defendants will be harmed by
being forced to sit at counsel table with other alleged criminals is not
problematic, nor, apparently, is it especially harmful for the jury to
hear information about co-defendants' misdeeds, at least to the extent
the evidence is limited to the co-defendants' conduct. 70 In short, the
71
risk of guilt by association seems overblown.
What does seem prejudicial is the jury being exposed to other
evidence that implicates the accused, regardless whether it comes in
directly, as proof against the defendant, or through evidence against
co-defendants that happens to include the defendant. Just as with
multiple count cases, multi-defendant trials can expose the jury to the
defendant's other bad conduct, and perhaps it is this spillover that
causes the rise in the conviction rates. This explanation is not perfect,
of course; if joining other parties lets incriminating information leak
in against the defendant, it is unclear why we see a prejudicial effect
when defendants face a single count but not when they face multiple
Nevertheless, the statistical evidence indicates that,
charges. 72
contrary to our working hypothesis, the prejudicial impact seems
directly tied to the evidence, not to the appearances of a multi73
defendant trial.
The impact of joinder on trial defendants is the primary topic of
this study but not the only one. An overwhelming majority of suspects
will plead guilty rather than stand trial, and a large percentage of this
group will also face multiple counts or be joined with others. 74 Since
70. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing whether "spillover" evidence has a
prejudicial effect).
71. Interestingly, nearly all of the social science experiments performed to date measure the
impact of joinder by testing the impact of joining counts; none were discovered that measure the
impact of joinder based on the effects of joining defendants. See Farrin, supra note 25, at 325-26
(finding, as of 1997, that "[a] large amount of empirical data exists for joinder of offenses, while
no empirical research has been done directly on joinder of defendants").
72. Recall that Table F, supra, shows that defendants charged with one count face a
significant increase in conviction rate as co-defendants are added, but those facing multiple
counts do not. If the prejudicial effect flows from the evidence introduced against co-defendants,
we would expect to see a similar conviction rate regardless of the number of charges filed against
the defendant. The explanation may be that defendants facing multiple charges already suffer
the prejudice associated with overlapping evidence, thus the similar evidence introduced in a codefendant's case has no effect on the jury. Under this view, evidence that indirectly implicates
the defendant has an effect only when the jury is not confronted with other, more direct evidence
of the defendant's wrongdoing.
73. For a potentially important qualification on this conclusion and a counter-hypothesis
that might explain the data, see infra Part IV.C.2.
74. See supra Table C and accompanying text.
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the decision to plead is typically made with an eye toward the
expected outcome of a trial, 75 we would expect to see the presence of
joined charges or co-defendants influence the decision of whether to
admit guilt. By hypothesis, if all other factors are equal, a defendant's
willingness to plead guilty should increase as the odds of conviction at
trial increase. We therefore would predict an increase in the guiltyplea rates that roughly parallels the conviction rates shown in Table
F.
In calculating the guilty-plea rates, we ignored the cases where
the defendant was successful in having the charges dismissed,7 6 and
those where the disposition was something other than trial or a guilty
plea. 77 For the remaining defendants, the guilty-plea rates correlate
78
to the joinder status as follows:
TABLE H
Guilty-Plea Rate by Joinder Status
One Defendant

Multiple Defendants

One Count

88%

86%

Multiple Counts

91%

87%

The inference drawn from Table H is that joinder has virtually
no impact on the decision to plead guilty, with our most-favored group
(one count, one defendant) being just as likely to plead as our
presumptive
least-favored
group
(multiple counts,
multiple
defendants). Perhaps this means that we are looking at the wrong
75. Even this seemingly simple observation has its critics. For a useful discussion of the
complexity of the plea decision, see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2463 (2004); see also William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingand Criminal
Law's DisappearingShadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004) (discussing Bibas's article).
76. Roughly 7 percent of all defendants considered in this study had their cases dismissed
(25,186 dismissed defendants / 375,720 total defendants = 0.067).
77. During the period of the study, there were 11,885 defendants whose cases were
dismissed "without prejudice." Although the cases were "final" for court-reporting purposes,
prosecutors may well have refiled many of these charges. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated,
these dismissals are not considered in the calculations. See also supranote 59.
78. Over the five years of this study, the number of defendants in each category and the
number of guilty pleas are as follows. There were 150,276 single defendants charged with a
single count, 132,299 of whom (88%) pled guilty. There were 95,299 single defendants charged
with multiple counts, 86,544 of whom (91%) pled guilty. In the multiple-defendant cases, there
were 33,264 who were charged with one count, 28,721 of whom (86%) pled guilty, and 96,881 who
were charged with multiple counts, 83,913 of whom (87%) pled guilty.
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variable, an issue that will be explored in the next Section. But for
current purposes, the lack of correlation between guilty pleas and
joinder is worth remembering. If it turns out that joinder does in fact
influence trial outcomes, we should then return to the issue of guilty
pleas and ask why the potential impact on the trial appears to play
little or no role in this critical decision.
B. Controllingfor Other Variables
The phrase "all things being equal" carried a lot of baggage in
the last Section; now it is time to unpack it. Somewhat (but not
entirely) consistent with our working hypotheses, we have seen that
there is a large gap in conviction rates based on joinder, with the
addition of counts appearing to be very important and the addition of
defendants being much less so. We should now test these conclusions
to see if they stand up when we control for other variables.
Our datasets allow us to generate several alternative theories
for why certain trial defendants are more likely to be convicted than
others, independent of the joinder effect. Four potential alternative
explanations are: (1) the conviction rate is affected by whether the
factfinder is a judge or the jury; (2) the conviction rate is affected by
the type of crimes charged, both the nature of the offense and its
seriousness; (3) the conviction rate is affected by the type of lawyer
representing the defendant, that is, whether counsel is appointed or
retained; and (4) the conviction rate is influenced by regional
characteristics, and thus differs from one part of the country to
another.
In considering each of these theories, we will first ask if there
are significant differences in the frequency of convictions that
correlate to the elements of the variable in question; we then will test
more rigorously to see if the effect of joinder remains substantial and
robust despite any correlations. As we consider each variable, we will
add its impact to our model, so that by the end of the Section, we will
have a cumulative measure of the joinder effect, one that controls for
all of the tested variables.
1. Judge vs. Jury
One explanation is that the difference in conviction rates is
explained primarily by the identity of the factfinder. On average,
juries are more likely to convict than judges, 7 9 and perhaps the
79. For an extensive discussion of this point, see Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal
Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 151 (2005).
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conviction
patterns
map onto
the
defendant's
choice of
decisionmaker.8 0
A more refined theory posits that perhaps
defendants are more likely to take multi-count, multi-defendant cases
to a jury, leaving the simpler cases for the more expeditious bench
trials.8 ' The judges' lower conviction rates thus may correlate with
joinder, without being a cause or effect of it.
It turns out that the identity of the factfinder does play a large
role in conviction rates. Among defendants who go to trial, those tried
by a jury were substantially more likely to be convicted, regardless of
their joinder status.
TABLE I
Conviction Rate by Factfinder
Conviction Rate
Jury Trial
(n = 13,835)
Bench Trial
(n = 5,222

This disparity is great enough that we should look at this
variable more closely. In particular, we should look at bench trials
and jury trials separately, to see if the joinder effect is still significant
within each subgroup of cases.
Continuing with the Probit Model developed in Table G, we can
82
control for the identity of the factfinder.

80. To say that defendants have a "choice" of factfinder glosses over a potential technical
problem. Although defendants have an absolute right to a jury in felony and serious
misdemeanor cases, they do not have the absolute right to choose a bench trial. Rule 23(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires agreement of the prosecutor and court for the
defense to waive a jury, and thus it is possible that defendants' preference for a bench trial is
vetoed in some cases. But as one of us (Leipold) noted in an earlier article, after conducting more
than two dozen interviews with prosecutors and defense counsel about this matter, absolutely no
evidence was found that prosecutors veto a defense preference for a bench trial in more than a
tiny fraction of cases. It seemed obvious that defendants' choice of factfinder is largely unchecked
by the government or the court. See Leipold, supra note 79, at 167-68 (noting that when defense
council seeks to waive jury trial prosecutors rarely veto this choice).
81. Some support for this view can be found in the very high percentage of misdemeanor
cases that are tried by the court rather than a jury, even when the right to a jury is present. See
infra note 88 and accompanying text (observing that misdemeanors and pretty crimes are
overwhelmingly tried by bench trials).
82. The correlation coefficient between the variables "guilty" and "factfinder" (a binomial
variable equal to one if the factfinder is jury, zero otherwise) is 0.3070, which shows a
considerable positive relationship between two variables. This requires us to look closely at the
effect of the factfinder on our model.
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TABLE J
Model 4
0.297
(0.0232)*

Variable
Counts

[0.000]**

Number of observations

-0.048
(0.0268)
[0.069]
0.775
(0.0239)
[0.000]
0.086
(0.0179)
[0.000]
19057

Pseudo R-Squared

0.0883

Number of defendants

Factfinder
(Judge/Jury)
Constant

*

Log likelihood
Standard errors in parentheses

-9462.4

** Numbers in brackets show the probability of coefficient being outside
the 95% confidence interval.
(1) It is equal to one if the defendant is convicted, zero otherwise.

Table J shows that adding the new variable makes the
coefficient of the variable "number of defendants" turn negative and
significantly different from zero at a 90% confidence interval, but not
at 95%, indicating that this variable is not very important in
explaining the conviction rates. Adding the factfinder variable also
decreases the effect of "counts" on the conviction rate, but the sign
remains positive, and the significance is strong enough that it
confirms the effect of "count" on conviction rates.
These figures allow us to calculate a revised joinder effect, one
that controls for the judge / jury distinction. First, the conviction rates
for each factfinder:
TABLE K
Jury Conviction Rates by Joinder Status
One
Defendant

Multiple
Defendants

One Count

81%

79%

Multiple Counts

88%

87%
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TABLE L

Bench Conviction Rates by Joinder Status
One
Defendant

Multiple
Defendants

One Count

53%

52%

Multiple Counts

65%

63%

Here we see in more concrete form what the earlier models had
predicted. Whether a defendant is tried by a jury or by the bench,
adding counts has a significant effect on the conviction rate, while
adding defendants without changing the number of counts has
virtually no impact.
Although consideration of the factfinder nicely supports our
working hypothesis, there are some mildly surprising figures in Tables
K and L. In particular, we would have predicted a more noticeable
joinder effect in jury trials than in bench trials. It is an article of legal
faith that judges are better than juries at ignoring irrelevant and
prejudicial evidence, and there is some feeling that they are better at
keeping complicated information straight. Yet the Tables suggest
otherwise: adding counts produces a ten or eleven percentage point
increase in conviction rates for bench trials, while additional counts
add only seven or eight percentage points to conviction rates in the
case of jury trials. This effect becomes less surprising, however, when
we consider how infrequently bench trials occur: more than 70% of all
trial defendants are tried by a jury.8 3 The relatively small number of
bench trials quite likely contributes to the larger variations in
conviction rates.
Because we are measuring joinder effects across all types of
cases, we will conclude this sub-section by re-combining bench and
jury trials. We do so, however, using a weighted average that
accounts for the heavy proportion of jury cases.8 4 Having thus
controlled for the impact of the factfinder on the conviction rates, we

83. Of the 19,057 trial defendants studied, 13,835 (72.6%) had their cases decided by a jury.
See supra Table I (showing that only 5,222 of the defendants studied had bench trials, whereas
13,835 had their cases tried by a jury).
84. Instead of putting one and zero (for bench and jury trial) and getting two separate
tables for two groups, we used the weighted average of factfinder variable to get a single table
that shows the probability of conviction for different joinder types after considering the effect of
factfinder. The weighted average is (13835/19057)*1 + (5222/19057)*0 = 0.72598.
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can now generate a new Table, one that shows a diminished but still
substantial joinder effect:
TABLE M
Trial Conviction Rates by Joinder Status
(controlling for identity of the factfinder)

One

Multiple

Difference

Defendant

Defendants

(in percentage points)

One Count

74%

73%

-1%

Multiple Counts

83%

82%

-1%

Difference

9%

(in percentage points) I

I

I

We will add the judge / jury variable to our model as we test
the impact of other factors. In a small gesture of mercy to the reader,
only the conclusions and simple frequency tables are set forth for the
remaining variables; the balance of the statistical models are set forth
in the Appendix.
2. Type of Crime
Not all types of crimes end in conviction at the same rate.
Weapons cases may be harder or easier for the prosecutor to win than
immigration cases; juries may be more harsh or lenient when the
defendant is charged with a misdemeanor instead of a felony. It also
may be that joinder is more common in some types of offenses than
others (expansive drug conspiracy trials, for example), and perhaps
this is the correlation that causes the gap in conviction rates, rather
than the joinder effect.
As these alternative theories show, "crime type" can be
considered along two dimensions. First, we can characterize offenses
by their seriousness, asking about the conviction rates and joinder
patterns for felonies, misdemeanors, and petty offenses.8 5 Second, we
can look at the nature of the alleged criminal act, putting the most
serious charge into one of seven categories: (a) violent crimes; (b)

85. In general, a felony is a crime for which more than one year imprisonment is
authorized, and a Class A misdemeanor is a crime for which six months to one year
imprisonment is authorized. See 18 U.S.C. § 3 5 59(a)(1)-(6) (2006) (defining generally the grades
of criminal offenses). A petty offense, which includes Class B and Class C misdemeanors as well
as infractions, includes crimes for which less than six months imprisonment or only a fine is
authorized. Id. §§ 3559(a)(7)-(9).
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property crimes; (c) drug crimes; (d) regulatory crimes; (e) public order
crimes; (f) weapons offenses; and (g) immigration crimes.8 6
The conviction rate fluctuates widely depending on whether the
most serious trial count ("Count 1") is a felony, misdemeanor, or petty
offense.
TABLE N
Crime Level

Conviction Rate

Felony
(n = 14,790)
Misdemeanor
(n = 3,077)
Petty
(n = 1,190)

82%
42%
96%
96%

The Table shows that nearly all top counts that are petty
offenses end in convictions, while fewer than half of the misdemeanor
charges do. But it turns out there is much less to these variations
than meets the eye. We also see that the overwhelming share of
Count ls (78%)87 charge a felony, leaving a relatively small number of
misdemeanor and petty offense cases. More importantly, drilling
down into the data reveals that there is a nearly complete overlap
between misdemeanor and petty offense cases and bench trials: an
astonishing 93% of cases where a misdemeanor is the most serious
charge and 95% of the cases where a petty crime is the most serious
are tried by the judge alone.88 Since we have already controlled for a
bench versus jury trial effect in our model, this should largely account
for the differences in conviction rates shown here.
In fact, when we control for crime seriousness in our model, we
see that the joinder effect remains, and is nearly unchanged. As
86. With one exception, these are the offense classifications used by the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts. See Offense Classification Table, http://fjsrc.urban.org/noframe/dd/cross
/aofjsp2002.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2006) (demonstrating this in the "FJSP Primary Offense"
column). The one exception is that we took the category "Public Order Offenses" -which covers
an extremely broad array of crimes-and broke it down into two subcategories: "regulatory"
offenses and "other" public order crimes. See id. (same). The former category includes civil rights
crimes, customs crimes, social security crimes and, postal offenses. The "other" public order
crimes include racketeering, extortion, criminal income tax evasion, and traffic offenses. Id.
87. Of the 19,057 defendants who were tried during the period of the study, 14,970 faced a
felony as the most serious charge (14,970 / 19,057 = 0.776).
88. Of the 3,077 defendants who went to trial facing a misdemeanor as the most serious
charge, 2,854 elected a bench trial. Similarly, of the 1,190 defendants who faced a petty offense,
1,131 either elected a bench trial or were required to have one because they were not entitled to
a jury. In contrast, only 8 percent of those charged with a felony in Count 1 (1,237 out of 14,790)
had a bench trial.
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shown in the Probit Model in the Appendix, joinder of counts still has
a positive and significant impact on the conviction rate, and joinder of
defendants does not. 89 As a result, when controlling for the identity of
the decisionmaker and the seriousness of the crime, we see the
following revised joinder effect:
TABLE 0
Conviction Rate by Joinder Status
(controlling for factfinder and crime seriousness)
One
Multiple
Difference
Defendant
Defendants
One Count

75%

73%

-2%

Multiple Counts

84%

83%

-1%

Difference

9%

10%

-

We therefore can say with some confidence that the differences
in conviction rates based on joinder status are not explained in any
meaningful way by the seriousness of the offense charged.
Controlling for the type of crime shows similar results. Once
again we begin with the basic conviction rates:

TABLE P
Crime Type
Violent
(n = 1,245)
Property
(n = 3,443)
Drug
(n = 6,171)
Weapon
(n = 2,210)
Immigration
(n = 644)
Regulatory
(n = 384)
Public Order
(n = 4,940)

Conviction Rate

80%
85%
80%
85%
63%
62%

89. The Appendix contains an expanded version of the Probit Model shown supra in Tables
G and J. The seriousness of the crime is first analyzed in Appendix Model 5.
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The outlying categories are regulatory and public order
offenses, but these are unlikely to have much explanatory power for
the conviction gap. The "regulatory" group is small, making up only
2% of the trial defendants. And while the public order group is larger
(26% of defendants), further investigation shows that an usually large
percentage of public order trials (74%) are bench trials, where the
conviction rates for all types of offenses are lower. 90 Again, because
our model has already controlled for the identity of the factfinder, we
would not expect this subset of offenses to materially change our
joinder hypotheses.
When we add this variable to our expanding model-now
controlling for factfinder, crime seriousness, and crime type-we see
virtually no change from the prior figures. 9 1

TABLE Q
Conviction Rate by Joinder Status
(controlling for decisionmaker, crime seriousness
and crime t ye)

One

Multiple

Defendant

Defendants

One Count

75%

73%

-2%

Multiple Counts

84%

83%

-1%

Difference

9%

10%

Difference

Difrec

3. Lawyer Type
Another variable we should consider is the type of lawyer the
defendant had. Here the data allow us to make three relevant
distinctions. 92 We can tell from the records when defendants were

90. Of the 4,940 defendants whose most serious charge was a public order offense, 3,653
elected bench trials (3,653 / 4,940 = 0.739). The conviction rate for public order bench trials was
53%, which is consistent with the lower conviction rates for bench trials across all categories of
crimes. See supra Table I (calculating conviction rate by factfinder).
91. The expanded Probit Model on which this table is based is set forth in the Appendix
infra at Model 6.
92. The data also allow us to examine cases where the defendant had no lawyer, either
because he was not entitled to one, see, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (holding
that the right to appointed counsel only applies to cases where defendant could be sentenced to
imprisonment), or because he waived counsel and proceeded pro se. Because of the small number
and the often unusual nature of these cases, defendants without counsel were not considered in
this part of the study.
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represented by retained counsel, when they were represented by fulltime defense counsel who work for a public defender's office, and when
they were represented by court appointed lawyers from the private
93
bar ("panel" attorneys).
Even speculative differences among the three groups are not
obvious and require some high-level generalizations. Perhaps, like
judges and juries, one group's clients have a much higher conviction
rate, one that explains the different outcomes better than joinder. It
may also be that different groups of lawyers approach joinder
problems differently. Those represented by retained lawyers may be
more likely to fight for severance because they have greater resources
to object to every prosecutorial move. Perhaps panel attorneys are
more likely to accept joinder because they find it easier to enter joint
defense agreements with co-counsel, thereby minimizing the (literal)
prisoner's dilemma problem.
Or perhaps public defenders, as
institutional repeat players, are more likely to fall into patterns on
joinder and severance issues, ones that over time become informal
practice norms within the office.
When we turn to the data, however, we see that while there is
some difference in conviction rates based on lawyer type, the gap is
not huge:
TABLE R
Lawyer Type
Retained
(n = 6,852)
Public Defender
(n = 3,309)
Panel Attorney
(n = 6,292)

Conviction %

78%
86%
1

Given this, we are unsurprised to see that our working
hypothesis is supported when we control for counsel type. Holding
this and all prior variables constant, our Probit Model shows that no
matter who represents the accused, adding counts increases the
likelihood of conviction, while joining defendants has little

93. A "panel" attorney is appointed by the district court from a list of private attorneys for a
particular case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (2006) (setting out the procedures for appointment of
counsel from a panel); see also CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 2 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf (defining panel attorneys as private attorneys chosen by the
district court from a list on a case by case basis).
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significance. 94 As a result, our revised conviction matrix changes very
little:
TABLE S
Conviction Rate by Joinder Type
(controlling for factfinder, crime seriousness, crime type, and defense
counsel)
Difference
Multiple
One
Defendants
Defendant
One Count

76%

73%

-3%

Multiple Counts

85%

83%

-2%

Difference

9%

10%

_

4. Geography
A final variable worth testing is regional influences. Here we
will use, as a very rough proxy, the federal judicial circuit where the
trial court is located. Each circuit has its own local rules, jury pools,
enforcement priorities, and case mix. Perhaps these variations lead to
different conviction rates and perhaps even to different local practices
that influence the joinder decision.
The trial conviction rates among the circuits are only mildly
revealing:
TABLE T

CADC
(n = 135)
CA1
(n = 1,369)
CA2
(n = 1,163)
CA3
(n = 889)

Trial Conviction Rates by Circuit
CA8
CA4
85%
C0%
(n =1,150)
(n = 2,496)
CA9
CA5
79%
92%
(n = 2,115)
(n = 2,065)
CA10
CA6
83%
78%77
(n = 734)
(n = 1,307)
CAll
CA7
82%
92%
(n = 4,752)
(n = 882)
84%

83%

57%

Here we see relatively modest variations in the conviction
rates, 95 with one outlier. 96 Yet even with these variations, our
94. See Appendix Model 7 (analyzing conviction rates relating to the type of defense
counsel).
95. The highest conviction rate is in the First and Seventh Circuits, at 92%, and the lowest
rate other than the Eleventh Circuit (discussed infra note 96) is the Tenth Circuit at 77%. The
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conclusions remain the same. Almost without regard to the location of
the trial, the joinder of counts significantly increases the likelihood of
97
conviction, and the addition of defendants has little or no effect.
We now have a full model, one that controls for factfinder,
crime seriousness, crime type, lawyer type, and geography, with only
the judge / jury distinction having a significant impact on the
conviction rate. Holding all these variables constant, we can calculate
the joinder effect more precisely:
TABLE U

Conviction Rate by Joinder Status (Final)
One

Multiple

Defendant

Defendants

One Count

76%

74%

-2%

Multiple Counts

85%

83%

-2%

Difference

9%

9%

-

Difference

From this model we can now draw some conclusions.
C. Conclusions
1. Joinder of counts has a significant impact on the outcome of
trials. A defendant who stands trial on a single count is roughly 9
percentage points less likely to be convicted than defendants who face
multiple counts.
Stated differently, a defendant's chances of
conviction increase by more than 10% if he stands trial on more than

unweighted mean rate of conviction, including the Eleventh Circuit, is 81%; the standard error
for conviction rates is 0.089.
96. The Eleventh Circuit has a conviction rate of only 57%, the lowest by twenty percentage
points. As explained in more detail elsewhere, see Leipold, supra note 79, at 192, the oddness of
the Eleventh Circuit is almost entirely a function of the extremely high number of bench trials
(and bench acquittals) in the district courts there. It turns out that the number of bench trials is
driven to a large extent by an unusual arrangement between two military bases and the district
courts of the Middle District of Georgia, under which violations that take place on the military
bases, including traffic offenses, are tried in the civilian courts. See id. at 192 n.142 (explaining
the details of the arrangement between the district and the military bases).
97. The impact of geography on the conviction rates is set forth in Appendix infra at Model
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one count.9 8 The impact of adding counts is present whether a
defendant stands trial alone or with other defendants.
2. Although the models test only the distinctions between one
count and more than one count, the frequency data discussed above in
Part III(A)(2)99 suggest that the conviction rate rises with the addition
of Count 2 and then again with Count 3, but after that remains
relatively stable for additional charges.
3. Somewhat surprisingly, the joinder effect of counts was
more pronounced in bench trials than in jury trials. However, the
unusual nature of the bench trial docket (disproportionately public
order crimes and misdemeanors), coupled with the relatively small
number of bench trials, makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions
from the data.
4. Joinder of defendants standing alone seems to have little
effect, despite the conventional wisdom that it does. In fact, holding
other variables constant, our model predicts no effect or even a slight
beneficial effect to the defense from the addition of a co-defendant.
The lack of impact is seen whether a defendant is charged with one
count or multiple counts.
5. As a result, and contrary to our hypothesis, those who face
both types of joinder are not the worst off. Although they are 7
percentage points more likely to be convicted than our most favored
group, they are no worse off than single defendants who face multiple
counts.
6. The joinder effect is quite robust. It is significant and
reliable in each instance when we analyze other variables, including
variables such as the identity of the factfinder, that are strongly
correlated to conviction rates.
7. Despite the prejudicial effect of joinder, defendants facing
multiple charges are not significantly more likely to plead guilty than
those who face only one charge.
D. Weaknesses: What's Missing
As with most empirical studies, the validity of the prior Section
is hostage to the limits on the data. In particular, there are two

98. The increase of nine percentage points, from the mid-70% range to the mid-80% range,
translates into a greater than 10% increase in the chances of conviction. Thus for defendants
standing trial alone, their chances go from 76% to 85% when counts are added, an increase of
almost 12% ((.85 - .76) /.76 = 0.118).
99. See supra note 65 and Figure 1 (showing a 68% to 82% jump when a second count is
added, 88% for a third count, and then the chance remaining steady for additional counts).
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variables we did not measure that could influence the conviction rates
and therefore alter our conclusions.
First, we cannot measure the relative strength of the evidence
across the different categories of cases. Perhaps defendants are more
likely to be acquitted in one-defendant, one-count cases because the
prosecutor had so little evidence of wrongdoing that she could only
muster a single charge against a single defendant. Stated differently,
the number of counts and defendants may increase as the strength of
the evidence increases, meaning that case quality, not prejudice from
a consolidated trial, is the explanatory variable. 10 0 This reasoning is
undermined somewhat by the plea bargaining statistics, which show
that there is virtually no difference in the guilty-plea rates based on
joinder status. 10 1 If there really were differences in case strength, we
would expect those with the weaker cases-by hypothesis, our single
defendant, single count group-to be disproportionately willing to take
their chances at trial, but the data show otherwise. Ultimately,
however, the only reliable indicator of case strength for a dataset this
size is the final outcome, and so this variable must remain an
unquantified limit on the conclusions.
Second, we could not account for individual defendant
characteristics that might have influenced the trial outcomes. The
government data that are publicly available redact information about
defendants' race, age, gender, education, and perhaps most
importantly, criminal history. It is easy to imagine stories that would
help explain why certain defendants are joined and convicted more
often, explanations that have only a marginal intersection with the
impact of joint trials. And so while it would be improper to assume
that these characteristics have an effect on conviction rates, we cannot
rule it out, leaving the calculations unfortunately incomplete.
IV. ANALYSIS
Increasing a defendant's chance of conviction by more than
10% is a high price to pay to secure the societal benefits of joined
trials. Armed with the data, we now can reconsider and perhaps reweigh the interests between the government and the accused.

100. Thanks to our colleague Steve Beckett for helping us develop this point.
101. See supra Table H and accompanying text (determining that the plea rates stay within
86% and 91% regardless of the joinder status).
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A. Rethinking the Defendant's Interest
The threshold question is why defendants' interests are
entitled to so little weight. We assume, as we should, that judges are
neutral when it comes to ruling on pretrial matters and would not
deliberately refuse to sever cases if they thought joinder would
unfairly harm the accused. So the fact that so many defendants are
worse off for what appears to be precisely that reason requires some
explanation.
We might conclude that courts are just not very good at
spotting problematic joinders. Motions to sever are typically made
pretrial, before the evidence is fully developed and before the judge
has immersed herself in the case. Defendants bear the burden of
proving prejudice, 10 2 and perhaps defendants can rarely do better than
1
speculate about the harms that they fear will flow from a joint trial. 03
But while the inability to prove harm almost certainly contributes to
the problem-especially if defense counsel fail to move for severance
as often as they should-it is doubtful that this is the primary culprit.
As noted above, the risks of prejudice arise frequently, are well
known, and are largely undisputed. 104
A more plausible explanation is that courts recognize the risks
but believe that jury instructions are genuinely curative. By training
and necessity, judges may believe that juries really do listen to,
understand, and implement the command that they compartmentalize
the evidence in their minds, applying each bit of information only to

102. See United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1084 (8th Cir. 2001) (explaining that there
is a strong presumption against severing cases that were joined properly); United States v.
LiCausi, 167 F.3d 36, 48 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the defendant seeking severance has the
burden to show that he would be severely prejudiced without it).
103. Wayne LaFave and his co-authors have nicely described the defendant's problems in
proving prejudice:
[I]t is very difficult for the trial judge to make a finding on the prejudice issue before
trial, for it involves speculation about many things which may or may not occur. Also,
judges are understandably reluctant to make a finding of prejudice during trial, after
the prosecution has put in most or all of its proof. And if a trial judge denies
defendant's severance motion on the ground that the showing of prejudice has not
been made, experience has shown that it is virtually impossible for the defendant to
prevail on appeal.
4 LAFAVE, supra note 4, at 602; see also United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 988-89 (11th
Cir. 2001) (analyzing defense argument that severance was required so defendant could obtain
the testimony of a co-defendant whom he claimed would testify on defendant's behalf in a
separate trial, but would refuse to testify in a joint trial). The court of appeals upheld the trial
judge's refusal to sever, finding that the affidavits submitted in support of his motion lacked
"specific and exonerative facts" needed to show prejudice. Id. at 989-90.
104. See supra Part II.B (laying out the three types of risk about which a suspect facing joint
counts is concerned).
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the defendant and the charge to which it relates. 10 5 When the use of
jury instructions is coupled with the other devices that are available to
soften the harshest forms of prejudice, 10 6 courts might believe that
they can still buy the benefits of consolidated trials at a relatively low
cost to the accused.
But ultimately there is more at work than inattention or
inadequate remedial efforts. It is impossible to miss the message of
the case law that some amount of prejudice is tolerable, and that
efficient trials are important enough to justify some genuine harm. In
the face of legislative silence, the Supreme Court has spoken clearly
about both the desirability of consolidated proceedings and the limited
class of harms that should lead to severance, 10 7 and most lower courts
have embraced this attitude without dissent. Whether judges are in
fact aware that the "prejudice premium" exceeds 10% is another
matter, but under current doctrine, it seems likely that judges would

105. Social science research on the effectiveness of jury instructions in curing the prejudice of
joint trials is not conclusive but is also not encouraging. See, e.g., Greene & Loftus, supra note
24, at 205 ("Our data showed that no matter when [the jury instruction] was presented, the
instruction was ineffective in reducing guilt estimates [of those who judged defendants charged
with multiple counts] to the level obtained from subjects who judged only one offense,"). These
findings were consistent with most, but not all, of the social science research on the topic. See,
e.g., Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, Social Inference Processes in Juror Judgments of MultipleOffense Trials, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 749, 761 (1984) (reporting that in a mock
juror experiment, "[a] very strong set of judges' instructions designed to eliminate joinder effects
had no influence on verdict judgments, or on any other dependent measures"). But see Sarah
Tanford et al., Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence of Charge Similarity,
Evidence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 319, 333-34 (1985)
(finding that limiting instructions reduced the joinder effect, while noting that "[t]his finding
runs counter to previous joinder research[,] and indeed, much of existing research in other
domains which indicates that limiting instructions tend to be ineffective" (citations omitted)).
106. Thus, for example, courts can require that prosecutors redact the pretrial statement of a
non-testifying co-defendant to eliminate any direct identifying reference to any of the joined
defendants who did not make the statement. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 197 (1998)
(allowing such a redacted statement where the defendant's name is replaced by a symbol). This
procedure is designed to address the so-called "Bruton problem." See Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123, 123-24 (1968). In Bruton, the Court found that when a non-testifying co-defendant
makes a pretrial statement that implicates the accused, it is unrealistic to believe that the jury
can limit its consideration of the statement to the co-defendant (against whom it would be
admissible), and not consider the statement against the accused (for whom it would be
inadmissible). Id. at 126.
107. See, e.g., Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993) (reaffirming the importance of
consolidated trials and, arguably, narrowing the type of harm that required severance). Although
the question presented in the case was whether antagonistic defenses required severance as a
matter of law (it does not), the Court stated that "a district court should grant a severance under
Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of
one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or
innocence." Id. at 539. As examples, the Court offered the Bruton problem, see supra note 106,
and cases where a co-defendant would provide exculpatory testimony but is entitled under the
Fifth Amendment not to take the stand in a joint trial. Id.
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not be surprised to learn that joinder makes a significant difference in
trial outcomes.
Still, there are reasons to think that courts have systematically
undervalued the defendant's interest in a separate proceeding. No
phrase better captures the current judicial mind-set than the oftrepeated "defendants are not entitled to severance merely because
08
they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials."'
While the phrase has a sensible ring to it-defendants want all kinds
of things they are not entitled to-it can inadvertently mask an
important distinction between severance motions and other types of
pretrial requests.
Courts and legislatures routinely evaluate the accused's
interest in certain procedures far lower than defendants would like,
but they do so because of a suspicion that what the defendant is really
seeking is either illegitimate or highly susceptible to abuse. For
example, defendants often want more pretrial disclosure from the
government than the rules allow, plausibly claiming that greater
discovery will reduce the chances of surprise and therefore lead to
more accurate trials. 109 No one disagrees with this argument in
isolation, but discovery is deliberately made restrictive because of the
fear that defendants will misuse the information, either to concoct a
better lie to offer in defense or to intimidate witnesses. 110 Likewise,
defendants who fail to abide by certain deadlines can be precluded
from presenting an alibi witness, raising an insanity defense,
changing counsel, or withdrawing a guilty plea,"' even though in
108. The phrase is most prominently featured in Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, and has been
repeated by numerous lower courts. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 26
(1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Flores, 362 F.3d 1030, 1040 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that a
defendant's possible better chance for acquittal in a separate trial is not sufficient to justify
severance); United States v. Cassano, 132 F.3d 646, 651 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Zafiro for the
idea that a defendant's increased chance of acquittal if tried alone is not enough to justify
severance).
109. For perhaps the best known articulation of this view, see William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 287 (1963);
see also H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal
Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1990-1991).
110. One prominent example of the struggle between fairness to the accused and the fear of
misuse concerns the pretrial disclosure of witness statements, with the Supreme Court initially
finding that equity required pretrial disclosure, see Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 67172 (1957), and Congress quickly reversing this judgment with the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a)
(2006). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 (incorporating substance of the Jencks Act).
111. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(e) (permitting the exclusion of alibi witnesses who are not
disclosed to the government within ten days of prosecutor's request for the names of such
witnesses); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(a) (providing that a defendant who fails to timely notify the
government of her intent to raise an insanity defense is barred from raising the defense at trial);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 1(d)-(e) (precluding a defendant from withdrawing a guilty plea after sentence,
and requiring leave of court to withdraw after the plea has been accepted but before sentencing).
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many instances it could plausibly be argued that allowing the request
would lead to more fair and accurate results. Once again, the belief is
that, in the absence of restrictions, defendants will deliberately
engage in strategic behavior to sandbag the prosecution, facilitate
perjury, or otherwise manipulate the system. And while advocates
quarrel over the size of the risk, the difficulty in sorting the legitimate
requests from the illegitimate ones means that even appropriate
defense requests end up being discounted.
But motions for severance are different because it is hard to
think of how greater use of severance could somehow undermine the
112
process. Defendants gain virtually nothing from a separate trial.
They are not entitled to keep out evidence in a separate proceeding
that would otherwise be admissible. There is no strategic game they
can play to hide evidence from the government or confuse the jury
about their actions or responsibility. The only benefit to a sole trial on
a single count is that it avoids the prejudice of joinder: inadmissible
evidence stays out, the jury keeps the evidence straight, no inference
of criminal disposition is created, and the defendant's trial choices
(e.g., to testify or not) are preserved.
A skeptic would argue that defendants always have a motive
for filing any colorable motion because they always have an incentive
to make the prosecutor's life miserable. The government, like the
defense, faces case-load pressures, and a successful severance motion
may lead to a more attractive plea offer from a prosecutor trying to
13
manage her now slightly-larger docket.
But this argument proves too much because any procedural
challenge that is made available to the defense creates this same
concern. The question is not whether defendants have a motive to file
the severance motion-we assume that they do-and not whether the
increased use of severance would lead prosecutors to change their
behavior, as it probably would. Instead, the issue is whether granting
112. Saying that defendants "gain nothing" is slightly overbroad, given the occasional
benefits of joint defense agreements as well as the other resource savings that accrue from
joinder. See supra notes 31-32, 42 and accompanying text (detailing some possible benefits from
joint trial).
113. A more refined argument would be that a motion to sever could influence the judge's
ruling on the admissibility of "other crimes" evidence. The government may have a good
argument under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for why evidence of crime B should be
admissible to prove crime A, but judges typically dislike mini-trials on uncharged offenses,
especially if they're time-consuming. So if defense counsel can persuade the judge to sever the
cases, the judge might very well decide that it would be wasteful to prove offense B twicenamely once in the trial of offense A and a second time in the severed proceeding on that count.
As a result, the judge might deny a Rule 404(b) motion by the government to prove offense B in
the trial of offense A. In such cases, defendants have nothing to lose by routinely moving to
sever.
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the motion would create the opportunity for defense mischief, would
deprive the prosecution of the chance to fairly prove its case, or would
otherwise distort the trial process-fears commonly used in other
contexts to strike the balance against the accused. Because the
defendant's separate trial should look virtually identical to the joint
trial, other than the prejudicial features that come from a single
proceeding, it is hard to understand why courts should be as tolerant
of prejudice here as they are in other, dissimilar, pretrial settings.
This brings us to an important conclusion. Now we can say not
only that joinder "prejudices" the defendant, but that joinder unfairly
causes prejudice. Unlike many other harms about which defendants
complain, the effects of spillover evidence, inference of a criminal
disposition, and jury confusion do not themselves further any policy
goals, do not avoid risks of defendant manipulation, and do not even
plausibly make trials more accurate or more fair - quite the contrary.
So to say a defendant is not entitled to a separate trial just because
his chances of acquittal are better is to say that a defendant should
not be granted a severance merely to avoid a significant (-10%) risk
114
that his conviction will be influenced by improper factors.
Framed in this way, it makes the current balance seem badly
struck. Outcomes based on impermissible factors immediately raise
the specter of wrongful convictions, and it is hard to argue that
abstract notions of efficiency are worth an appreciable increase in the
risk of sending innocent people to jail. The last few years have
revealed a rash of demonstrably false convictions, stories that can
easily drown out claims of scarce dollars, crowded dockets, and
11 5
witness inconvenience.
114. The restrictive severance rules are also distinctive because, unlike other circumstances
where we force defendants down a less desirable litigation path, there is not countervailing value
to the accused. We know, for example, that many suspects foolishly decide to waive their right to
a conflict-free lawyer, or waive counsel entirely and represent themselves, even though no
neutral observer would believe that this is in the defendant's best interests, and, indeed, can
easily lead to less accurate results. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c)(2) (requiring trial judges to inquire
into cases of joint representation, although not requiring that each defendant be represented by
counsel who has no conflict of interest). In these cases, we accept the predictable harm that flows
to the defendant because we value some other legitimate interest that is also of value to the
defense, namely, autonomy and the right to make decisions about one's own interest. There is no
comparable value to the accused in favoring joint trials over single trials.
115. It is important not to oversell this point. Many of the factors present in the false
conviction cases, such as bad eyewitness identifications and false confessions, are just as likely in
a single count, single defendant case as in any other, and would be unaffected by severance. For
extensive discussions of the wrongful conviction problem and its causes, see Samuel L. Gross et
al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523,
523-27 (2005) (analyzing the results of a study compiling exonerations from wrongful
convictions); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How
TO MAKE IT RIGHT 361 (2000) (showing factors leading to wrongful convictions).
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The problem, of course, is that the strength of the defendant's
interests is only one side of the balance. Before condemning the
injustice of the current practices, we should also re-examine the
government's interests.
B. Rethinking the Government's Interest
No matter what the data show, at some level there is an
undeniable interest in joined trials, and thus genuine weight on the
government's side of the scales. But once again, there is reason to
think that the correlation between joint trials and efficiency is less
than is sometimes believed.
1. The Conventional Interests
The criminal caseload in the federal district courts has
increased over 50% since 1995 (and almost 15% just since 2000),116
while the number of authorized judgeships during that time rose only
slightly. 117 Most of the additional load has been absorbed by plea
bargaining; in fact, the pace of guilty pleas has picked up, leading to a
decrease in both the percentage of cases that go to trial 18 and in the
absolute number of trial defendants.11 9 But even extra plea bargains
take time, and so it is unsurprising that institutional pressures to
clear the docket have seeped into the severance decisions.
Whether the caseload pressure would be significantly
compounded by rules that encouraged more frequent severance is
another matter. Robert Dawson pointed out over a quarter-century
116. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload
Statistics, Judicial Caseload Indicators, Calendar Years 1995, 2000, 2003, and 2004,
www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/front/judbusO3.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2006) (providing
caseload statistics for U.S. federal courts, the Federal Probation System, and pretrial services).
The number of criminal cases filed increased 56.7% between 1995 and 2004, while the number of
defendants against whom charges were filed increased 47.2%. The increase between 2000 and
2004 was 15.5% for the number of cases filed, and 13% for the number of defendants. Id.
117. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures, tbl
3.1, Criminal Cases and Defendants Filed, Terminated, Pending (Includes Transfers),
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table3.01.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2006) (showing
that the number of authorized judgeships in the U.S. district courts rose from 649 in 1995 to 679
in 2004, an increase of less than 5%).
118. Between 1994 and 2003, the percentage of defendants who stood trial dropped from
slightly over 9% of defendants to slightly over 4%. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE,
tbl.
5.22, http://www.albany.edusource
booklpdf/t522.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2006) (reporting, by type of disposition, the number of
defendants disposed of in U.S. district courts from 1945 to 2003).
119. Between 1994 and 2003, the number of federal defendants who had their case disposed
of at trial dropped by more than one-third, from 5,526 defendants in 1994 to only 3,463 in 2003.
Id.
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ago the fallacy of assuming that a greater use of severance would
result in a proportional increase in the number of trials. 120 A
defendant who successfully moves for three separate trials may not
stand trial three times; if the first trial ends in a conviction (as most
121
do), the defendant may quickly plead guilty to the remaining counts.
Conversely, if the first trial ends in an acquittal, the prosecutor might
decide to cut her losses and either offer an attractive deal to the
remaining defendants or even nol pros the remaining charges. While
the ultimate impact of fewer consolidated trials is an empirical
question, this type of Bayesian reasoning by the parties could
122
dramatically lower the costs of increased severance.
It also is worth noting that while the federal caseload has
steadily increased, the frequency of joinder has remained constant. If
we look at the percentage of all defendants (not just trial defendants)
who face multiple charges or who are joined with co-defendants yearby-year, we see virtually no change in the charging behavior of the
government.
TABLE V
123
Percenta ge of Cases Joined, by Year
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
50%
52%
52% 50%
Multiple Counts
50%
Multiple Defendants
35% 35%
35%
35%
33%

Total
51%
34%

Given the incentives the government has to consolidate
proceedings, these figures suggest that prosecutors have maximized
their joinder authority and cannot obtain more consolidated

120. See Dawson, supra note 2, at 1389-91 (discussing how severance actually may lead to
the disposition of a second case through settlement rather than through a trial).
121. A defendant is particularly likely to plead guilty to the remaining counts following a
conviction on the first if he believes that he has a chance of receiving a reasonable sentence
reduction. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2004) (permitting a two
to three level reduction in the offense level if the defendant "clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense").
122. See Dawson, supra note 2, at 1389-91 (discussing how severance actually may lead to
the disposition of a second case through settlement rather than through a trial). In support of his
argument, Professor Dawson noted a 1973 study in Vermont, where defendants had the right to
separate trials if they were charged with serious felonies. Id. at 1390. Although joint trials in
these cases became "virtually unheard of," most of the time the first trial was the only trial; after
the verdict in the first case was known, the rest of the cases were resolved out of court. As a
result of this (admittedly limited) study, the state judges and prosecutors concluded that
separate trials were more economical than joint trials. Id. at 1390-91 (discussing Peter
Langrock, Joint Trials:A Short Lesson From Little Vermont, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 612 (1973)).
123. The number of defendants considered in each of the years were: 71,738 in 1999; 72,997
in 2000; 73,463 in 2001; 76,381 in 2002; and 81,141 in 2003, for a total of 375,720 defendants.
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indictments without significantly changing their case mix. In any
event, the figures indicate that the increased case load is being
absorbed only in proportional terms by joint proceedings.
The other articulated government interest-avoiding the
"scandal of inconsistent verdicts"-is easier to dismiss because it has
always felt like a makeweight argument. While courts genuinely care
about the perception of fairness arising from trials, institutionally the
system has a thick skin; it does not embarrass easily. 124 The claim of
scandal seems particularly overdone in the context of jury verdicts,
where courts have repeatedly upheld verdicts that were internally
inconsistent in the same case.125 More pointedly, the awkwardness of
having juries make inconsistent decisions in separate trials pales in
comparison to the scandal of wrongful convictions, which, at the
margins, joint trials seem to foster.
2. The Interest in Convictions
There is a third government interest at stake, one that is rarely
discussed in the cases or literature. There will be times when the
prosecutor has enough evidence to bring an additional charge or indict
an additional defendant, but because of resource constraints will only
do so if the new charge or defendant can be joined with others. The
124. Compare, for example, the Supreme Court's earlier view that the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule was justified in part by the independent need to prevent courts from becoming
"accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold," see Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960), with its later, singular, focus on whether the
exclusionary rule served as a deterrent. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35
(1978) (concluding that "judicial integrity rationale" was subsumed by the inquiry into whether
exclusion of evidence deterred unlawful police conduct). Consider also United States v. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), where the defendant was kidnapped in a foreign country and
brought to the U.S. to stand trial. The Court rejected a claim that the charges should be
dismissed because of the illegal method used to bring defendant before the court, saying:
Respondent... may be correct that [his] abduction was "shocking," and that it may be
in violation of general international law principles.... We conclude, however, that
respondent's abduction was not in violation of the Extradition Treaty between the
United States and Mexico ....
The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not
therefore prohibit his trial in a court in the United States for violations of the criminal
laws of the United States.
Id. at 669-70.
125. Federal courts have repeatedly ruled that inconsistent verdicts in the same case are not
grounds for overturning a defendant's conviction. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,
279 (1943) ("Whether the jury's verdict was the result of carelessness or compromise or a belief
that [one defendant] should suffer the penalty [and not the other] . . . is immaterial. Juries may
indulge in precisely such motives or vagaries."); see also Dawson, supra note 2, at 1391-92
(rejecting the premise of the "inconsistent verdict" rationale that separate trials against similar
co-defendants really are identical: "[a]lmost always the evidence admissible in different trials
against alleged coparticipants in an offense will differ enough to permit different treatment by
the jury," particularly when co-defendants are represented by different attorneys).
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charge may be minor enough or the additional defendant peripheral
enough to the primary criminality that it would be too expensive, too
burdensome on the participants, or simply not worth the trouble to
bring but for the availability of joint trials.
More defense-favorable severance rules could undermine this
interest because the net results would be fewer charges and fewer
126
convictions, presumptively leading to more unpunished crime.
Whether these foregone prosecutions ultimately represent a cost or a
benefit depends on whether we view this type of resource constraint as
a valuable check on prosecutorial zealousness or as an unfortunate
opportunity cost. 127 But even if we assume that the marginal loss of
prosecutions is a social cost, the waters are still muddy. Once we look
at the data, alternate explanations emerge for bringing the extra
charge against the extra defendant.
One lurking question about the government's charging conduct
is whether prosecutors are unfairly using the prejudicial impact of
joinder to improve their hand at trial. Here the worry is not that
prosecutors are simply seeking an additional conviction by adding an
extra name or charge to the indictment; instead, the worry is that
prosecutors might bring additional charges or indict additional
defendants simply to gain the prejudicial effect of joinder to help
convict on the existing charges. Stated differently, prosecutors might
be using the joinder effect "offensively," adding less serious charges to
the indictment just to bias the factfinder and help them convict on the
more serious charges.128

126. The percentage of foregone prosecutions that actually resulted in unpunished crime
under this scenario is unclear because some of the activity not charged by the federal authorities
presumably would be prosecuted by the states.
127. It may be that the mere possibility of dropped charges also gives defendants an
incentive to file severance motions in every case, a point discussed in notes 112-113 and
accompanying text. While a more generous severance policy will of course provide some incentive
for more motions, the likelihood that defendants will be able to use this fact strategically seems
small. A prosecutor who worries that a court will sever will presumably take that into account
before seeking the indictment. Once the prosecutor has accounted for the possibility of severance
in her charging decision, however, the only increase in the number of severance motions
granted-andthus, the only increase in the defendant's interest to act strategically-should be
in cases where the prosecutor misjudged what the court would do. In such a case, even if the
prosecutor would not have filed the smaller matter in the first instance, she may continue to
prosecute the separate charge or defendant anyway, given the significant strategic and political
disincentives to dismiss a case once it is filed.
128. It is possible that prosecutors might also join additional defendants who would not
otherwise be charged, simply to get the prejudicial effects of multi-defendant trial. On balance,
however, this risk seems smaller than the possibility of adding weak counts. Not only is the
joinder effect of adding defendants quite small, the need to fully prove at least one charge
against each defendant should be a deterrent to adding marginal parties. So for purposes of this
sub-section, the discussion will be limited to the risk of compounding charges.
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This risk is speculative because there are many legitimate
reasons why a prosecutor would want to charge defendants with as
many counts as the evidence will bear. The Constitution may require
the joinder of all charges, 129 or the prosecutor may worry that an
acquittal in the first trial may collaterally estop a later proceeding.130
Juries are often characterized as unpredictable, 13 1 and so giving a full
range of choices on which to convict, including lesser included
offenses, is usually prudent. Sometimes the defendant will have
committed ten crimes but there is only admissible proof of five, and so
charging all five will help the punishment reflect the defendant's
actual criminal behavior. But even allowing for these reasons, the
joinder effect creates a risk that additional counts will be filed or
defendants will be joined despite the relative weakness of the evidence
to support these new charges, simply because the prosecutor wants to
paint a picture for the jury of a criminally-disposed defendant.
Courts are not blind to this risk. In a recent opinion upholding
a refusal to sever, the Fifth Circuit observed:
We are keenly aware that the claimed "efficiency" of a joint trial can be a surrogate for
the reality that a joint trial of multiple defendants is simply to the advantage of the
government. It is the potential presence of prosecutorial
advantage distinct from the
13 2
expense of duplicating efforts that draws our attention.

129. In general, if the various charges the prosecutor wants to bring have the same elements,
or one is a lesser included offense of the other, both charges must be brought in the same
proceeding. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 705 (1993) (concluding that "where
the two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the 'same-elements'
test, the double jeopardy bar applies" and, in accord, that "prosecution for a greater offense...
bars prosecution for a lesser included offense").
130. Collateral estoppel will prevent a prosecutor from bringing a charge in a second trial
that was "actually and necessarily" decided in the defendant's favor in the first. See Shiro v.
Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 236 (1994) (stating that there is no collateral estoppel effect when a jury
fails to return a verdict unless the record shows that the issue was actually and necessarily
decided in the defendant's favor); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970) (stating that where
there is a general acquittal verdict, the court must examine the entire record to determine
whether a rational jury could have based that verdict on an issue other than that which the
defendant seeks to collaterally estop). Because of the general nature of jury verdicts, however, it
is often impossible to tell what was "necessarily" resolved in the first trial, making the doctrine
quite narrow. See generally 4 LAFAVE, supranote 4, § 17.4(a).
131. But note that no matter how unpredictable juries appear in individual cases, collectively
their behavior is extremely stable. Between 1989 and 2002, federal juries always convicted
between 80% and 85% of the defendants who appeared before them. See Leipold, supra note 79,
at 164-65 (discussing the conviction rates for juries as compared to those of judges).
132. United States v. Simmons, 374 F.3d 313, 318 (5th Cir. 2004). Interestingly, the Fifth
Circuit's observations appear to have been raised sua sponte; the defendant in Simmons did not
raise the issue of strategic governmental behavior in his briefs. See Brief for Appellant at 35,
United States v. Simmons, 374 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-10515), 2003 WL 23857777
(arguing that the failure to severe was an abuse of discretion because of specific facts in a unique
situation).
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Admittedly, the impact of adding charges to the indictment can
push prosecutors in both directions. On the one hand there is the
simple but powerful fact that juries are more likely to convict on the
most serious count if there are other crimes alleged. 133 It would take a
courageous or oblivious prosecutor not to consider this fact when
making the charging decision. On the other hand, there are risks:
adding a weak charge may undermine the government's credibility
with the jury, possibly infecting the other, stronger charges. Adding
counts also means spending more scarce resources and may
complicate the case presentation in undesirable ways.
Not surprisingly, there is no direct evidence of how often
prosecutors bring charges with the hopes of gaining a trial advantage.
We can, however, track the disposition of these additional charges.
Our dataset ranks the counts according to their severity, allowing us
to compare the outcome of the top count with the outcome of the less
serious charges.
TABLE W

CountI

Count 5

Count 4

Count 3

Count 2

Disposition

o

.

<

Convict
77%
(n =14,589)

78%

7%

12%

61%

8%

Acquit
23%
(n - 4,468)

0%

85%

12%

0%

72%

<

U

<

25%

49%

8%

36%

41%

8%

45%

24%

0.2%

63%

31%

0.3%

56%

37%

<

U

Here we see some intriguing numbers. If a defendant is
convicted at trial of the top count (which is 77% likely), he has a
nearly identical chance (78%) of being convicted of the next most
serious count. But as more charges are added, the chances of being
convicted of each new count drop dramatically. At Count 3, a full
quarter of those charges end up being dismissed. At Count 4, more
than one-third of the charges are being dismissed, and by Count 5,
almost one-half (45%) of the charges end in dismissal. Moreover, at
Count 5, more than half of the final charges are being resolved
133. See supra Table U and accompanying text (discussing conviction rates based on joinder
of counts and defendants).
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favorably to the defense, through a combination of dismissal and
acquittal.134
It is important to put these numbers in context. It is quite
likely that a large number of dismissed charges following a conviction
on Count 1 are the byproduct of the prosecutorial practice of charging
several overlapping crimes-including lesser included charges - for a
single criminal act. Because a defendant can normally be punished
only once for a single crime, 135 lesser and overlapping charges that
follow a conviction of the top count will often be dismissed as a matter
of course. This could falsely inflate the impression created by the
dismissal statistics that the additional counts are weak.
Yet even if this explains a significant portion of the dismissal
statistics, it does not change the effect of the charging practices. For
whatever reason, the percentage of counts that does not reach the jury
almost quadruples between Count 2 and Count 5, such that by Count
5, the court (or prosecutor 136) has concluded that the charges cannot or
should not be pursued. Critically, however, the addition of these extra
counts still has a positive correlation to the likelihood of convicting on
Count 1.137 Whether the later charges are alternative theories or
stand-alone instances of criminality that warrant separate
punishment, the data raise difficult questions about the wisdom of
giving this degree of charging flexibility when it comes at such a high
cost.

134. Interestingly, if the defendant is acquitted for the first count, the government's chances
for success in any respect drop dramatically. Virtually all of the remaining charges end up being
dismissed or end in acquittal. And so with acquittals, but not with convictions, it is fair to say
that as goes the first count, so goes the rest of the case.
135. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 (1996) (presuming that the legislature
does not intend to impose multiple punishments where more than one statutory provision
proscribes the "same offense"); see also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) (stating that
double jeopardy does nothing more than preclude a court from sentencing a defendant to a
greater punishment than the legislature intended). For a highly insightful analysis of this area
of the law, see George C. Thomas III, A Blameworthy Act Approach to the Double Jeopardy Same
Offense Problem, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1995).
136. In this study "dismissal" includes cases where the case was dismissed on the
defendant's motion or on the government's motion, including the government's decision to nol
pros a case. See Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base Codebook at
21-22 (values for Termination Disposition Code 1 (DISP1)), available at www.icpsr.umich.edu/
cgi-binlbob/archive2?study=8429&path=ICPSR (documentation for ICPSR 8429).
137. See supra Figure 1 and accompanying text; see also supra Table U and accompanying
text (discussing conviction rates based on joinder of counts and defendants). Recall that the
models used to measure the joinder effect were calculating the change in conviction rate of
Count 1.
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C. Remedies and Questions
1. What Remedy?
The data provide modest support for the argument that some
rebalancing of the interests-fairness to the accused versus efficiency
of processing cases-is in order. As usual, identifying the problem
does not tell us how to solve it, and this study is more concerned with
the former than the latter. There are, however, some points that
might inform any remedial efforts.
The simple and unrealistic solution would be to recast the rules
and permit defendants to have separate counts or separate parties
severed on demand. But in the modern age, this type of proposal
seems highly improbable, at least in the federal system. Now and in
the foreseeable future, criminal case processing will take place under
resource pressures, making any proposal with the potential to
significantly multiply the number of trials a likely non-starter.138
Alternatively, we might place a heavy thumb on the defense
side of the balance. For example, we might say that a "colorable" or
"prima facie" claim of prejudice by the defense is sufficient to shift the
burden to the government to prove that joinder will not cause undue
harm. 139 At a minimum, the doctrine could be modified to eliminate
the judicial requirement of "substantial" or "compelling" prejudice
before severance is ordered. 140 This would require some change in the
138. But see 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 31, §§ 13-3.1, 13-1.2
(providing for severance as of right for charges not based on the same conduct or on a common
plan); 4 LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 17.1(f), at 602-03 & 2005 Supp. at 77 ("Pursuant to statutes and
rules of court so providing, and in [two] instance[s] by virtue of a court decision, some states have
now given defendants an absolute right to a severance in certain circumstances." (footnotes
omitted)).
139. See Dawson, supra note 2, at 1453-54 (discussing a similar proposal). A prosecutor
might do this, for example, by showing that all of the evidence that would come in at a joint trial
would in fact be admitted at separate trials. Although this is similar to the analysis courts now
employ, see supra note 47 and accompanying text, simply shifting the burden of proof would be
significant, since prosecutors typically have greater knowledge of what the evidence will show.
The problems of forcing the defendant to speculate about the evidence would thus be reduced.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. The data suggest that courts should be
particularly suspicious where a defendant faces joined counts that are of the "same or similar
character." Not only are multi-count cases the ones where prejudice is most likely to arise, but
charges that are not connected by a common plan or scheme or are not part of the same
transaction seem to offer far fewer efficiency benefits. A defendant charged with two unrelated
bank robberies will not face overlapping witnesses or other evidence, but will run the risk of jury
confusion of the evidence that is by definition similar but unrelated. Unconnected charges are
also the ones that are most likely to put a defendant in an untenable position of having to choose
between testifying in his own defense or not, particularly if defendant is factually guilty of only
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case law but not in the Federal Rules; Rule 14 merely indicates that a
court should take action if a joinder "appears to prejudice a
defendant."
Even if not essential, legislative attention would nonetheless be
useful. Rule 14 has not been amended in relevant part since its
enactment in 1946,141 and a refreshed look at severance is past due.
But while better rules would help, the solution ultimately must be
found in the judiciary. Because joinder is clearly appropriate in many
cases and clearly improper in others, some balancing is inevitable and
judges are the only ones who can do it. Perhaps it will be sufficient for
judges to keep in mind the size of the prejudicial effect of joinder.
Perhaps the data presented above will be a caution against assuming
too readily that jury instructions and other measures can adequately
protect the defendant's interests. Or perhaps a simple judicial refocus
on the interests at stake, realizing that defendants' interests may be
greater and the government's interest smaller than conventional
wisdom suggests, might help avoid the routine approval of
consolidated cases, decisions that now often seem reflexive rather
than nuanced.
2. Questions
There are two remaining questions that can contribute to the
debate, or at least provide direction for future study.
a. Joinder of Defendants
One surprising finding of this study is that joinder of
defendants has no measurable impact. We have suggested a partial
explanation for it: perhaps the appearance of a joint trial - the fear of
guilt by association from having multiple defendants sitting together
at counsel table - matters very little to a jury, but hearing additional
evidence matters a lot. Because adding defendants necessarily means
adding more evidence, it may be that jury confusion about the facts is

one charge. For a discussion of the criticisms that have been directed at the "same or similar
character" joinder provision, see 1A C. Wright, supra note 9, § 143, at 33-43; see also United
States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733, 738 (4th Cir. 1976) ("[The only real convenience served by
permitting joint trial of unrelated offenses against the wishes of the defendant may be the
convenience of the prosecution in securing a conviction.").
141. A 1966 amendment added what is now subsection (b) to Rule 14, which provides that
before ruling on a motion to sever, the trial court can order the prosecutor to provide for in
camera review any statements by the defendant that the government intends to use as evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 14(b). Amendments made in 2002 were stylistic only. See Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 14, reprinted in 3C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, App. C, at 228.
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causing the prejudice, not the optics of a multi-party case.1 42 If the
joinder effect really is about the evidence rather than the appearances
of a joint trial, the lack of impact caused by co-defendants is easier to
understand.
But there is an alternative explanation. Perhaps the impact of
this type of joinder varies according to the circumstances of the
defendant. Perhaps if the accused is the less or least culpable member
of the joined group, he is actually better off than if he were being tried
alone because the jury will be most interested in the real bad actors
and more inclined to give the small players the benefit of the doubt.
The obverse is that more culpable defendants are in fact prejudiced by
the joinder for the same reason. Thus, our statistical conclusions that
show no impact of adding defendants may show nothing more than
that there is no effect on average. Our analysis might mask the fact
that half of the defendants (the less culpable half) could be better off
because of joinder, while the more culpable half is worse off. We do
not know if this theory is correct, but testing this hypothesis could be
a productive area of additional study.
b. Plea Bargaining
Any analysis of the criminal process would be incomplete
without some discussion of plea bargaining. Another puzzling feature
of the data is that a defendant's joinder status does not appear to
influence whether he takes a plea or goes to trial. As noted, whether a
defendant has joined counts, joined co-defendants, both, or neither,
seems to make no real difference: between 86% and 91% of defendants
in all groups plead guilty, with those in the most favored group just as
likely to plead as those facing multiple counts along with codefendants. 143 This is counterintuitive: we wrongly hypothesized that
as the chances of conviction increased, the incentive to plead would
also increase as the expected value of a trial went down.
The fact that the plea rate remains constant may just be
evidence that parties lack information. Perhaps defense lawyers
assume there is a vague risk of prejudice from joint trials, but either
underestimate the effect or do not sufficiently account for it in their
decisionmaking. On the other hand, the guilty-plea data may show
that the parties are working with perfect information. Perhaps both
prosecutors and defendants know precisely how prejudicial joinder is,
but the prosecutor adjusts her plea offer accordingly. As the likelihood
142. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Table H and accompanying text (examining the rate of guilty pleas based on
joinder status).
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of conviction at trial changes, the prosecutor increases or decreases
the attractiveness of the inducement, fine-tuning the negotiations
until collectively about 90% of all defendants plead. Given that
prosecutors and many defense attorneys are the prototypical repeat
players, and given the caseload pressures outlined above, this latter
explanation seems quite plausible. But this is speculation only, and
further research about plea negotiation practices might shed useful
light on the topic.

V. CONCLUSION

Our study shows that the joinder of charges has a prejudicial
effect on the defendant, increasing the chances of conviction of the
most serious charge by more than 10%. Somewhat surprisingly, the
data do not show a similar prejudicial effect for joinder of defendants,
although more research is needed to determine if our figures are
hiding potentially large differences in impact among sub-groups of
defendants.
In addition to offering empirical findings, we have argued that
courts currently miscalculate the defense and governmental interests
when deciding whether to sever. In particular, we claim that judges
undervalue the defendants' interests, in part because they may
assume that defendants are trying to gain some tactical or unfair
advantage from separate trials. This fear seems exaggerated; we
could not identify any illegitimate reason why a defendant would seek
severance. At the same time, the fear of increased trials in a world of
more generous severance also seems overdone. More severance would
undoubtedly lead to some increase in the number of proceedings, but
given the predictive effect of the first trial outcome on the rest of the
cases, it is questionable whether all, or even most, subsequent trials
would find their way to the courtroom.
At a minimum, the existence of the joinder effect calls for a
reexamination of the doctrine. A significant increase in the likelihood
of conviction, one that appears to be based on factors that detract from
the fairness of the proceedings and even the accuracy of the outcome,
is a steep price to pay for more efficient proceedings. The critical need
to reduce those costs without materially undermining the benefits of
consolidation means that even dry and technical issues, like joinder
and severance, warrant another look.
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APPENDIX
This Probit Model is a continuation of the ones in Tables G and
J in the main text. The individual models within the Appendix Table
control for the cumulative effect of the variables discussed in Part
III(B). Model 5 analyzes the impact of the seriousness of the crime,
Model 6 the type of crime, Model 7 the type of defense counsel, and
Model 8 the judicial circuit where the trial occurred. Each model
includes the effects of all prior variables, including the number of
counts, number of defendants, and factfinder.
Probit Model of guilty/not guilty at trial on the most serious charge
Variable
Counts

Number of defendants

Factfinder (=1 if jury)

Offence level dummy
(=1 if misdemeanor)

(dependent variable: Guilty('))
Model 7
Model 6
Model 5

Model 8

0.320

0.340

0.326

0.321

(0.0238)*
[0.000]**

(0.0242)
[0.000]

(0.0244)
[0.000]

(0.0247)
[0.000]

-0.057

-0.049

-0.081

-0.063

(0.0268)
[0.033]

(0.0276)
[0.073]

(0.0280)
[0.004]

(0.0283)
[0.025]

0.848
(0.0353)

0.855
(0.0361)

0.800
(0.0367)

0.808
(0.0371)

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

-2.040
(0.0713)

-2.048
(0.0712)

-1.759
(0.0781)

-1.597
(0.0856)

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

Offence level dummy
(=1 if felony)

-1.727
(0.0755)
[0.000]

Offence type dummy
(=1 if violent)

-

-1.871
(0.0796)
[0.0001
-0.735
(0.3529)
[0.037]
-0.730
(0.3514)
[0.038]
-0.610
(0.3511)
[0.082]
-1.242
(0.3569)

-1.894
(0.0814)
[0.0001
-0.728
(0.3558)
[0.041]
-0.662
(0.3545)
[0.062]
-0.582
(0.3541)
[0.100]
-1.165
(0.3599)

-1.722
(0.0880)
[0.000]
-0.722
(0.3538)
[0.041]
-0.651
(0.3525)
[0.065]
-0.546
(0.3522)

[0.001]

[0.0011

[0.001]

-0.823
(0.3518)
[0.019]

-0.645
(0.3552)
[0.070]

-0.616
(0.3533)
[0.081]

Offence type dummy
(=1 if property)
Offence type dummy
(=1 if drug)
Offence type dummy
(=1 if regulatory)
Offence type dummy
(=1 if public order)

[0.121]
-1.147
(0.3580)
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Variable (continued)
Offence type dummy
(=1 if weapon)
Offence type dummy
(=1 if immigration)
Lawyer type dummy
(=1 if retained)
Lawyer type dummy
(=1 if public defender)
Lawyer type dummy
(=1 if panel attorney)
Circuit dummy
(=1 if CA1)
Circuit dummy
(=1 if CA2)
Circuit dummy
(=1 if CA3)
Circuit dummy
(=1 if CA4)
Circuit dummy
(=1 if CA5)
Circuit dummy
(=1 if CA6)
Circuit dummy
(=1 if CA7)
Circuit dummy
(=1 if CA8)

Model 5

Model 6
-0.733
(0.3518)
[0.0371
-0.333
(0.3554)
[0.3481
-

403

Model 7

Model 8

-0.694
(0.3547)
[0.051]
-0.294
(0.3582)
[0.4121
0.525
(0.0518)
[0.000]
0.565
(0.0544)
[0.0001
0.786
(0.0536)
[0.000]

-0.695
(0.3528)
[0.049]
-0.254
(0.3564)
[0.476]
0.394
(0.0549)
[0.000]
0.449
(0.0575)
[0.000]
0.626
(0.0570)
[0.000]
0.115
(0.1468)
[0.435]
-0.075
(0.1404)
[0.596]
-0.025
(0.1424)

[0.860]

0.256
(0.1371)
[0.062]
-0.113
(0.1370)
[0.4101
-0.091
(0.1390)
[0.515]
0.433
(0.1474)
[0.003]
-0.146
(0.1399)
[0.296]
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Variable (continued)

Model S

Model 6

Circuit dummy

Model 7
-

(=1 if CA9)

Model 8
0.017

(0.1374)
[0.899]

Circuit dummy

-0.209

(=1 if CA1O)

(0.1433)
[0.144]

Circuit dummy

-

-

-

-0.236

(=1 if CA1l)
Constant

1.734
(0.0647)

2.547
(0.3578)

1.957
(0.3642)

(0.1357)
[0.082]
1.932
(0.3875)

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.00]

Number of observations
19057
19057
19057
19057
Pseudo R-Squared
0.1525
0.1592
0.1707
0.1827
Log likelihood
-8795.6
-8726.2
-8607.1
-8482.1
* Standard errors in parentheses
** Numbers in brackets show the probability of coefficient being outside the
95% confidence interval.
(1) It is equal to one if the defendant is convicted, zero otherwise.

